Computational linguistics involves the use of computers to compile linguistic data, analyse languages, translate from one language to another, and develop and test models of language processing. Linguists use computers and large samples of actual language to analyse the relatedness and the structure of languages and to look for patterns and similarities. Computers also assist in stylistic studies, information retrieval, various forms of textual analysis, and the construction of dictionaries and concordances. Applying computers to language studies has resulted in a machine translated systems and machines that recognize and produce speech and text. Such machines facilitate communication with humans, including those who are perceptually or linguistically impaired.
Applied linguistics employs linguistic theory and methods in teaching and in research on learning a second language. Linguists look at the errors people make as they learn another language and at their strategies for communicating in the new language at different degrees of competence. In seeking to understand what happens in the mind of the learner, applied linguists recognize that motivation, attitude, learning style, and personality affect how well a person learns another language.
Anthropological linguistics, also known as linguistic anthropology, uses linguistic approaches to analyse culture. Anthropological linguists examine the relationship between a culture and its language. The way cultures and languages have moderately changed uninterruptedly through intermittent intervals of time. And how various cultures and languages are related to each other, for example, the present English usage of family and given names arose in the late 13th and early 14th centuries when the laws concerning registration, tenure, and inheritance of property were changed.
Once linguists began to study language as a set of abstract rules that somehow account for speech, other scholars began to take an interest in the field. They drew analogies between language and other forms of human behaviour, based on the belief that a shared structure underlies many aspects of a culture. Anthropologists, for example, became interested in a structuralist approach to the interpretation of kinship systems and analysis of myth and religion. American linguist Leonard Bloomfield promoted structuralism in the United States.
Saussure's ideas also influenced European linguistics, most notably in France and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic). In 1926 Czech linguist Vilem Mathesius founded the Linguistic Circle of Prague, a group that expanded the focus of the field to include the context of language use. The Prague circle developed the field of phonology, or the study of sounds, and demonstrated that universal features of sounds in the languages of the world interrelate in a systematic way. Linguistic analysis, they said, should focus on the distinctiveness of sounds rather than on the ways they combine. Where descriptivist tried to locate and describe individual phonemes, such as /b/ and /p/, the Prague linguists stressed the features of these phonemes and their interrelationships in different languages. In English, for example, the voice distinguishes between the similar sounds of /b/ and /p/, but these are not distinct phonemes in a number of other languages. An Arabic speaker might pronounce the cities Pompeii and Bombay the same way.
As linguistics developed in the 20th century, the notion became prevalent that language is more than speech - specifically, that it is an abstract system of interrelationships shared by members of a speech community. Structural linguistics led linguists to look at the rules and the patterns of behaviour shared by such communities. Whereas structural linguists saw the basis of language in the social structure, other linguists looked at language as a mental process.
The 1957 publication of ‘Syntactic Structures’ by American linguist Noam Chomsky initiated what many views as a scientific revolution in linguistics. Chomsky sought a theory that would account for both linguistic structure and the creativity of language - the fact that we can create entirely original sentences and understand sentences never before uttered. He proposed that all people have an innate ability to acquire language. The task of the linguist, he claimed, is to describe this universal human ability, known as language competence, with a grammar from which the grammars of all languages could be derived. The linguist would develop this grammar by looking at the rules children use in hearing and speaking their first language. He termed the resulting model, or grammar, a transformational-generative grammar, referring to the transformations (or rules) that create (or account for) language. Certain rules, Chomsky asserted, are shared by all languages and form part of a universal grammar, while others are language specific and associated with particular speech communities. Since the 1960s much of the development in the field of linguistics has been a reaction to or against Chomsky's theories.
At the end of the 20th century, linguists used the term grammar primarily to refer to a subconscious linguistic system that enables people to produce and comprehend an unlimited number of utterances. Grammar thus accounts for our linguistic competence. Observations about the actual language we use, or language performance, are used to theorize about this invisible mechanism known as grammar.
The scientific study of language led by Chomsky has had an impact on nongenerative linguists as well. Comparative and historically oriented linguists are looking for the various ways linguistic universals show up in individual languages. Psycholinguists, interested in language acquisition, are investigating the notion that an ideal speaker-hearer is the origin of the acquisition process. Sociolinguists are examining the rules that underlie the choice of language variants, or codes, and allow for switching from one code to another. Some linguists are studying language performance - the way people use language - to see how it reveals a cognitive ability shared by all human beings. Others seek to understand animal communication within such a framework. What mental processes enable chimpanzees to make signs and communicate with one another and how do these processes differ from those of humans?
From these initial concerns came some of the great themes of twentieth-century philosophy. How exactly does language relate to thought? Are the irredeemable problems about putative private thought? These issues are captured under the general label ‘Lingual Turn'. The subsequent development of those early twentieth-century positions has led to a bewildering heterogeneity in philosophy in the early twenty-first century. the very nature of philosophy is itself radically disputed: Analytic, continental, postmodern, critical theory, feminist t, and non-Western, are all prefixes that give a different meaning when joined to ‘philosophy'. The variety of thriving different schools, the number of professional philosophers, the proliferation of publications, the development of technology in helping research as all manifest a radically different situation to that of one hundred years ago.
As with justification and knowledge, the traditional view of content has been strongly Internalist in character. The main argument for externalism derives from the philosophy y of language, more specifically from the various phenomena pertaining to natural kind terms, indexicals, etc. that motivate the views that have come to be known as 'direct reference' theories. Such phenomena seem at least to show that the belief or thought content that can be properly attributed to a person is dependant on facts about his environment, e.g., whether he is on Earth or Twin Earth, what is fact pointing at, the classificatory criterion employed by expects in his social group, etc. - not just on what is going on internally in his mind or brain.
An objection to externalist account of content is that they seem unable to do justice to our ability to know the content of our beliefs or thought 'from the inside', simply by reflection. If content is depending on external factors pertaining to the environment, then knowledge of content should depend on knowledge of these factors - which will not in general be available to the person whose belief or thought is in question.
The adoption of an externalist account of mental content would seem to support an externalist account of justification, apart from all contentful representation is a belief inaccessible to the believer, then both the justifying statuses of other beliefs in relation to that of the same representation are the status of that content, being totally rationalized by further beliefs for which it will be similarly inaccessible. Thus, contravening the Internalist requirement for justification, as an Internalist must insist that there are no justification relations of these sorts, that our internally associable content can also not be warranted or as stated or indicated without the deviated departure from a course or procedure or from a norm or standard in showing no deviation from traditionally held methods of justification exacting by anything else: But such a response appears lame unless it is coupled with an attempt to show that the externalised account of content is mistaken.
Except for alleged cases of thing s that are evident for one just by being true, it has often been thought, anything is known must satisfy certain criteria as well as being true. Except for alleged cases of self-evident truths, it is often thought that anything that is known must satisfy certain criteria or standards. These criteria are general principles that will make a proposition evident or just make accepting it warranted to some degree. Common suggestions for this role include position ‘p', e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4, ‘p' is evident or, if ‘p' coheres wit h the bulk of one's beliefs, ‘p' is warranted. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truths, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceive s ‘p', ‘transmit' the status as evident they already have without criteria to other proposition s like ‘p', or they might be criteria whereby purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g., facts about logical connections or about conception that need not be already evident or warranted, originally ‘create' p's epistemic status. If that in turn can be ‘transmitted' to other propositions, e.g., by deduction or induction, there will be criteria specifying when it is.
Nonetheless, of or relating to tradition a being previously characterized or specified to convey an idea indirectly, as an idea or theory for consideration and being so extreme a design or quality and lean towards an ecocatorial suggestion that implicate an involving responsibility that include: (1) if a proposition ‘p', e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4, is clearly and distinctly conceived, then ‘p' is evident, or simply, (2) if we can't conceive ‘p' to be false, then ‘p' is evident: Or, (3) whenever are immediately conscious o f in thought or experience, e.g,, that we seem to see red, is evident. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truth s, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceives, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceives ‘p', ‘transmit' the status as evident they already have for one without criteria to other propositions like ‘p'. Alternatively, they might be criteria whereby epistemic status, e.g., p's being evident, is originally created by purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g., facts about how ‘p' is conceived which are neither self-evident is already criterial evident.
The result effect, holds that traditional criteria do not seem to make evident propositions about anything beyond our own thoughts, experiences and necessary truths, to which deductive or inductive criteria ma y be applied. Moreover, arguably, inductive criteria, including criteria warranting the best explanation of data, never make things evident or warrant their acceptance enough to count as knowledge.
Contemporary epistemologists suggest that traditional criteria may need alteration in three ways. Additional evidence may subject even our most basic judgements to rational correction, though they count as evident on the basis of our criteria. Warrant may be transmitted other than through deductive and inductive relations between propositions. Transmission criteria might not simply ‘pass' evidence on linearly from a foundation of highly evident ‘premisses' to ‘conclusions' that are never more evident.
As with justification and knowledge, the traditional view of content has been strongly Internalist in character. The main argument for externalism derives from the philosophy y of language, more specifically from the various phenomena pertaining to natural kind terms, indexicals, etc. that motivate the views that have come to be known as 'direct reference' theories. Such phenomena seem at least to show that the belief or thought content that can be properly attributed to a person is dependant on facts about his environment, e.g., whether he is on Earth or Twin Earth, what is fact pointing at, the classificatory criterion employed by expects in his social group, etc. - not just on what is going on internally in his mind or brain.
An objection to externalist account of content is that they seem unable to do justice to our ability to know the content of our beliefs or thought 'from the inside', simply by reflection. If content is depending on external factors pertaining to the environment, then knowledge of content should depend on knowledge of these factors - which will not in general be available to the person whose belief or thought is in question.
The adoption of an externalist account of mental content would seem to support an externalist account of justification, apart from all contentful representation is a belief inaccessible to the believer, then both the justifying statuses of other beliefs in relation to that of the same representation are the status of that content, being totally rationalized by further beliefs for which it will be similarly inaccessible. Thus, contravening the Internalist requirement for justification, as an Internalist must insist that there are no justification relations of these sorts, that our internally associable content can also not be warranted or as stated or indicated without the deviated departure from a course or procedure or from a norm or standard in showing no deviation from traditionally held methods of justification exacting by anything else: But such a response appears lame unless it is coupled with an attempt to show that the externalised account of content is mistaken.
Except for alleged cases of thing s that are evident for one just by being true, it has often been thought, anything is known must satisfy certain criteria as well as being true. Except for alleged cases of self-evident truths, it is often thought that anything that is known must satisfy certain criteria or standards. These criteria are general principles that will make a proposition evident or just make accepting it warranted to some degree. Common suggestions for this role include position ‘p', e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4, ‘p' is evident or, if ‘p' coheres wit h the bulk of one's beliefs, ‘p' is warranted. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truths, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceive s ‘p', ‘transmit' the status as evident they already have without criteria to other proposition s like ‘p', or they might be criteria whereby purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g., facts about logical connections or about conception that need not be already evident or warranted, originally ‘create' p's epistemic status. If that in turn can be ‘transmitted' to other propositions, e.g., by deduction or induction, there will be criteria specifying when it is.
Nonetheless, of or relating to tradition a being previously characterized or specified to convey an idea indirectly, as an idea or theory for consideration and being so extreme a design or quality and lean towards an ecocatorial suggestion that implicate an involving responsibility that include: (1) if a proposition ‘p', e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4, is clearly and distinctly conceived, then ‘p' is evident, or simply, (2) if we can't conceive ‘p' to be false, then ‘p' is evident: Or, (3) whenever are immediately conscious o f in thought or experience, e.g,, that we seem to see red, is evident. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truth s, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceives, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceives ‘p', ‘transmit' the status as evident they already have for one without criteria to other propositions like ‘p'. Alternatively, they might be criteria whereby epistemic status, e.g., p's being evident, is originally created by purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g., facts about how ‘p' is conceived which are neither self-evident is already criterial evident.
The result effect, holds that traditional criteria do not seem to make evident propositions about anything beyond our own thoughts, experiences and necessary truths, to which deductive or inductive criteria ma y be applied. Moreover, arguably, inductive criteria, including criteria warranting the best explanation of data, never make things evident or warrant their acceptance enough to count as knowledge.
Contemporary epistemologists suggest that traditional criteria may need alteration in three ways. Additional evidence may subject even our most basic judgements to rational correction, though they count as evident on the basis of our criteria. Warrant may be transmitted other than through deductive and inductive relations between propositions. Transmission criteria might not simply ‘pass' evidence on linearly from a foundation of highly evident ‘premisses' to ‘conclusions' that are never more evident.
A group of statements, some of which purportedly provide support for another. The statements which purportedly provide the support are the premisses while the statement purportedly support is the conclusion. Arguments are typically divided into two categories depending on the degree of support they purportedly provide. Deductive arguments purportedly provide conclusive support for their conclusions while inductively supports the purported provision that inductive arguments purportedly provided only arguments purportedly in the providing probably of support. Some, but not all, arguments succeed in providing support for their conclusions. Successful deductive arguments are valid while successful inductive arguments are valid while successful inductive arguments are strong. An argument is valid just in case if all its premisses are true its conclusion is only probably true. Deductive logic provides methods for ascertaining whether or not an argument is valid whereas, inductive logic provides methods for ascertaining the degree of support the premisses of an argument confer on its conclusion.
Finally, proof, least of mention, is a collection of considerations and reasons that instill and sustain conviction that some proposed theorem - the theorem proved - is not only true, but could not possibly be false. A perceptual observation may instill the conviction that water is cold. But a proof that 2 + 5 = 5 must not only instill the conviction that is true that 2 + 3 = 5, but also that 2 + 3 could not be anything but the digit 5.
Contemporary philosophers of mind have typically supposed (or at least hoped) that the mind can be naturalized -, i.e., that all mental facts have explanations in the terms of natural science. This assumption is shared within cognitive science, which attempts to provide accounts of mental states and processes in terms (ultimately) of features of the brain and central nervous system. In the course of doing so, the various sub-disciplines of cognitive science (including cognitive and computational psychology and cognitive and computational neuroscience) postulate a number of different kinds of structures and processes, many of which are not directly implicated by mental states and processes as commonsensical conceived. There remains, however, a shared commitment to the idea that mental states and processes are to be explained in terms of mental representations.
In philosophy, recent debates about mental representation have centred around the existence of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) and the determination of their contents (how they come to be about what they are about), and the existence of phenomenal properties and their relation to the content of thought and perceptual experience. Within cognitive science itself, the philosophically relevant debates have been focussed on the computational architecture of the brain and central nervous system, and the compatibility of scientific and commonsense accounts of mentality.
Intentional Realists such as Dretske (e.g., 1988) and Fodor (e.g., 1987) note that the generalizations we apply in everyday life in predicting and explaining each other's behaviour (often collectively referred to as 'folk psychology') are both remarkably successful and indispensable. What a person believes, doubts, desires, fears, etc. is a highly reliable indicator of what that person will do. We have no other way of making sense of each other's behaviour than by ascribing such states and applying the relevant generalizations. We are thus committed to the basic truth of commonsense psychology and, hence, to the existence of the states its generalizations refer to. (Some realists, such as Fodor, also hold that commonsense psychology will be vindicated by cognitive science, given that propositional attitudes can be construed as computational relations to mental representations.)
Intentional Eliminativists, such as Churchland, (perhaps) Dennett and (at one time) Stich argue that no such things as propositional attitudes (and their constituent representational states) are implicated by the successful explanation and prediction of our mental lives and behaviour. Churchland denies that the generalizations of commonsense propositional-attitude psychology are true. He (1981) argues that folk psychology is a theory of the mind with a long history of failure and decline, and that it resists incorporation into the framework of modern scientific theories (including cognitive psychology). As such, it is comparable to alchemy and phlogiston theory, and ought to suffer a comparable fate. Commonsense psychology is false, and the states (and representations) it postulates simply don't exist. (It should be noted that Churchland is not an eliminativist about mental representation tout court.
Dennett (1987) grants that the generalizations of commonsense psychology are true and indispensable, but denies that this is sufficient reason to believe in the entities they appear to refer to. He argues that to give an intentional explanation of a system's behaviour is merely to adopt the 'intentional stance' toward it. If the strategy of assigning contentful states to a system and predicting and explaining its behaviour (on the assumption that it is rational -, i.e., that it behaves as it should, given the propositional attitudes it should have in its environment) is successful, then the system is intentional, and the propositional-attitude generalizations we apply to it are true. But there is nothing more to having a propositional attitude than this.
Though he has been taken to be thus claiming that intentional explanations should be construed instrumentally, Dennett (1991) insists that he is a 'moderate' realist about propositional attitudes, since he believes that the patterns in the behaviour and behavioural dispositions of a system on the basis of which we (truly) attribute intentional states to it are objectively real. In the event that there are two or more explanatorily adequate but substantially different systems of intentional ascriptions to an individual, however, Dennett claims there is no fact of the matter about what the system believes (1987, 1991). This does suggest an irrealism at least with respect to the sorts of things Fodor and Dretske take beliefs to be; though it is not the view that there is simply nothing in the world that makes intentional explanations true.
(Davidson 1973, 1974 and Lewis 1974 also defend the view that what it is to have a propositional attitude is just to be interpretable in a particular way. It is, however, not entirely clear whether they intend their views to imply irrealism about propositional attitudes.). Stich (1983) argues that cognitive psychology does not (or, in any case, should not) taxonomize mental states by their semantic properties at all, since attribution of psychological states by content is sensitive to factors that render it problematic in the context of a scientific psychology. Cognitive psychology seeks causal explanations of behaviour and cognition, and the causal powers of a mental state are determined by its intrinsic 'structural' or 'syntactic' properties. The semantic properties of a mental state, however, are determined by its extrinsic properties -, e.g., its history, environmental or intra-mental relations. Hence, such properties cannot figure in causal-scientific explanations of behaviour. (Fodor 1994 and Dretske 1988 are realist attempts to come to grips with some of these problems.) Stich proposes a syntactic theory of the mind, on which the semantic properties of mental states play no explanatory role.
It is a traditional assumption among realists about mental representations that representational states come in two basic varieties (Boghossian 1995). There are those, such as thoughts, which are composed of concepts and have no phenomenal ('what-it's-like') features ('Qualia'), and those, such as sensory experiences, which have phenomenal features but no conceptual constituents. (Non-conceptual content is usually defined as a kind of content that states of a creature lacking concepts but, nonetheless enjoy. On this taxonomy, mental states can represent either in a way analogous to expressions of natural languages or in a way analogous to drawings, paintings, maps or photographs. (Perceptual states such as seeing that something is blue, are sometimes thought of as hybrid states, consisting of, for example, a Non-conceptual sensory experience and a thought, or some more integrated compound of sensory and conceptual components.)
Some historical discussions of the representational properties of mind (e.g., Aristotle 1984, Locke 1689/1975, Hume 1739/1978) seem to assume that Non-conceptual representations - percepts ('impressions'), images ('ideas') and the like - are the only kinds of mental representations, and that the mind represents the world in virtue of being in states that resemble things in it. On such a view, all representational states have their content in virtue of their phenomenal features. Powerful arguments, however, focussing on the lack of generality (Berkeley 1975), ambiguity (Wittgenstein 1953) and non-compositionality (Fodor 1981) of sensory and imagistic representations, as well as their unsuitability to function as logical (Frége 1918/1997, Geach 1957) or mathematical (Frége 1884/1953) concepts, and the symmetry of resemblance (Goodman 1976), convinced philosophers that no theory of mind can get by with only Non-conceptual representations construed in this way.
Contemporary disagreement over Non-conceptual representation concerns the existence and nature of phenomenal properties and the role they play in determining the content of sensory experience. Dennett (1988), for example, denies that there are such things as Qualia at all; while Brandom (2002), McDowell (1994), Rey (1991) and Sellars (1956) deny that they are needed to explain the content of sensory experience. Among those who accept that experiences have phenomenal content, some (Dretske, Lycan, Tye) argue that it is reducible to a kind of intentional content, while others (Block, Loar, Peacocke) argue that it is irreducible.
The representationalist thesis is often formulated as the claim that phenomenal properties are representational or intentional. However, this formulation is ambiguous between a reductive and a non-deductive claim (though the term 'representationalism' is most often used for the reductive claim). On one hand, it could mean that the phenomenal content of an experience is a kind of intentional content (the properties it represents). On the other, it could mean that the (irreducible) phenomenal properties of an experience determine an intentional content. Representationalists such as Dretske, Lycan and Tye would assent to the former claim, whereas phenomenalists such as Block, Chalmers, Loar and Peacocke would assent to the latter. (Among phenomenalists, there is further disagreement about whether Qualia are intrinsically representational (Loar) or not (Block, Peacocke).
Most (reductive) representationalists are motivated by the conviction that one or another naturalistic explanation of intentionality is, in broad outline, correct, and by the desire to complete the naturalization of the mental by applying such theories to the problem of phenomenality. (Needless to say, most phenomenalists (Chalmers is the major exception) are just as eager to naturalize the phenomenal - though not in the same way.)
The main argument for representationalism appeals to the transparency of experience. The properties that characterize what it's like to have a perceptual experience are presented in experience as properties of objects perceived: in attending to an experience, one seems to 'see through it' to the objects and properties it is experiences of. They are not presented as properties of the experience itself. If nonetheless they were properties of the experience, perception would be massively deceptive. But perception is not massively deceptive. According to the representationalist, the phenomenal character of an experience is due to its representing objective, non-experiential properties. (In veridical perception, these properties are locally instantiated; in illusion and hallucination, they are not.) On this view, introspection is indirect perception: one comes to know what phenomenal features one's experience has by coming to know what objective features it represents.
In order to account for the intuitive differences between conceptual and sensory representations, representationalists appeal to their structural or functional differences. Dretske (1995), for example, distinguishes experiences and thoughts on the basis of the origin and nature of their functions: an experience of a property 'P' is a state of a system whose evolved function is to indicate the presence of 'P' in the environment; a thought representing the property 'P', on the other hand, is a state of a system whose assigned (learned) function is to calibrate the output of the experiential system. Rey (1991) takes both thoughts and experiences to be relations to sentences in the language of thought, and distinguishes them on the basis of (the functional roles of) such sentences' constituent predicates. Lycan (1987, 1996) distinguishes them in terms of their functional-computational profiles. Tye (2000) distinguishes them in terms of their functional roles and the intrinsic structure of their vehicles: thoughts are representations in a language-like medium, whereas experiences are image-like representations consisting of 'symbol-filled arrays.' (The account of mental images in Tye 1991.)
Phenomenalists tend to make use of the same sorts of features (function, intrinsic structure) in explaining some of the intuitive differences between thoughts and experiences; but they do not suppose that such features exhaust the differences between phenomenal and non-phenomenal representations. For the phenomenalist, it is the phenomenal properties of experiences - Qualia themselves - that constitute the fundamental difference between experience and thought. Peacocke (1992), for example, develops the notion of a perceptual 'scenario' (an assignment of phenomenal properties to coordinates of a three-dimensional egocentric space), whose content is 'correct' (a semantic property) if in the corresponding 'scene' (the portion of the external world represented by the scenario) properties are distributed as their phenomenal analogues are in the scenario.
Another sort of representation championed by phenomenalists (e.g., Block, Chalmers (2003) and Loar (1996)) is the 'phenomenal concept' -, a conceptual/phenomenal hybrid consisting of a phenomenological 'sample' (an image or an occurrent sensation) integrated with (or functioning as) a conceptual component. Phenomenal concepts are postulated to account for the apparent fact (among others) that, as McGinn (1991) puts it, 'you cannot form [introspective] concepts of conscious properties unless you yourself instantiate those properties.' One cannot have a phenomenal concept of a phenomenal property 'P', and, hence, phenomenal beliefs about P, without having experience of 'P', because 'P' itself is (in some way) constitutive of the concept of 'P'. (Jackson 1982, 1986 and Nagel 1974.)
Though imagery has played an important role in the history of philosophy of mind, the important contemporary literature on it is primarily psychological. In a series of psychological experiments done in the 1970s (summarized in Kosslyn 1980 and Shepard and Cooper 1982), subjects' response time in tasks involving mental manipulation and examination of presented figures was found to vary in proportion to the spatial properties (size, orientation, etc.) of the figures presented. The question of how these experimental results are to be explained has kindled a lively debate on the nature of imagery and imagination.
Kosslyn (1980) claims that the results suggest that the tasks were accomplished via the examination and manipulation of mental representations that they have spatial properties, i.e., pictorial representations, or images. Others, principally Pylyshyn (1979, 1981, 2003), argue that the empirical facts can be explained in terms exclusively of discursive, or propositional representations and cognitive processes defined over them. (Pylyshyn takes such representations to be sentences in a language of thought.)
The idea that pictorial representations are literally pictures in the head is not taken seriously by proponents of the pictorial view of imagery. The claim is, rather, that mental images represent in a way that is relevantly like the way pictures represent. (Attention has been focussed on visual imagery - hence the designation 'pictorial'; Though of course, there may imagery in other modalities - auditory, olfactory, etc. - as well.)
The distinction between pictorial and discursive representation can be characterized in terms of the distinction between analog and digital representation (Goodman 1976). This distinction has itself been variously understood (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981, Goodman 1976, Haugeland 1981, Lewis 1971, McGinn 1989), though a widely accepted construal is that analog representation is continuous (i.e., in virtue of continuously variable properties of the representation), while digital representation is discrete (i.e., in virtue of properties a representation either has or doesn't have) (Dretske 1981). (An analog/digital distinction may also be made with respect to cognitive processes. (Block 1983.)) On this understanding of the analog/digital distinction, imagistic representations, which represent in virtue of properties that may vary continuously (such for being more or less bright, loud, vivid, etc.), would be analog, while conceptual representations, whose properties do not vary continuously (a thought cannot be more or less about Elvis: either it is or it is not) would be digital.
It might be supposed that the pictorial/discursive distinction is best made in terms of the phenomenal/nonphenomenal distinction, but it is not obvious that this is the case. For one thing, there may be nonphenomenal properties of representations that vary continuously. Moreover, there are ways of understanding pictorial representation that presuppose neither phenomenality nor analogicity. According to Kosslyn (1980, 1982, 1983), a mental representation is 'quasi-pictorial' when every part of the representation corresponds to a part of the object represented, and relative distances between parts of the object represented are preserved among the parts of the representation. But distances between parts of a representation can be defined functionally rather than spatially - for example, in terms of the number of discrete computational steps required to combine stored information about them. (Rey 1981.)
Tye (1991) proposes a view of images on which they are hybrid representations, consisting both of pictorial and discursive elements. On Tye's account, images are '(labelled) interpreted symbol-filled arrays.' The symbols represent discursively, while their arrangement in arrays has representational significance (the location of each 'cell' in the array represents a specific viewer-centred 2-D location on the surface of the imagined object)
The contents of mental representations are typically taken to be abstract objects (properties, relations, propositions, sets, etc.). A pressing question, especially for the naturalist, is how mental representations come to have their contents. Here the issue is not how to naturalize content (abstract objects can't be naturalized), but, rather, how to provide a naturalistic account of the content-determining relations between mental representations and the abstract objects they express. There are two basic types of contemporary naturalistic theories of content-determination, causal-informational and functional.
Causal-informational theories hold that the content of a mental representation is grounded in the information it carries about what does (Devitt 1996) or would (Fodor 1987, 1990) cause it to occur. There is, however, widespread agreement that causal-informational relations are not sufficient to determine the content of mental representations. Such relations are common, but representation is not. Tree trunks, smoke, thermostats and ringing telephones carry information about what they are causally related to, but they do not represent (in the relevant sense) what they carry information about. Further, a representation can be caused by something it does not represent, and can represent something that has not caused it.
The main attempts to specify what makes a causal-informational state a mental representation are Asymmetric Dependency Theories, the Asymmetric Dependency Theory distinguishes merely informational relations from representational relations on the basis of their higher-order relations to each other: informational relations depend upon representational relations, but not vice-versa. For example, if tokens of a mental state type are reliably caused by horses, cows-on-dark-nights, zebras-in-the-mist and Great Danes, then they carry information about horses, etc. If, however, such tokens are caused by cows-on-dark-nights, etc. because they were caused by horses, but not vice versa, then they represent horses.
According to Teleological Theories, representational relations are those a representation-producing mechanism has the selected (by evolution or learning) function of establishing. For example, zebra-caused horse-representations do not mean zebra, because the mechanism by which such tokens are produced has the selected function of indicating horses, not zebras. The horse-representation-producing mechanism that responds to zebras is malfunctioning.
Functional theories, hold that the content of a mental representation are well grounded in causal computational inferential relations to other mental portrayals other than mental representations. They differ on whether relata should include all other mental representations or only some of them, and on whether to include external states of affairs. The view that the content of a mental representation is determined by its inferential/computational relations with all other representations is holism; the view it is determined by relations to only some other mental states is localisms (or molecularism). (The view that the content of a mental state depends on none of its relations to other mental states is atomism.) Functional theories that recognize no content-determining external relata have been called solipsistic (Harman 1987). Some theorists posit distinct roles for internal and external connections, the former determining semantic properties analogous to sense, the latter determining semantic properties analogous to reference (McGinn 1982, Sterelny 1989)
(Reductive) representationalists (Dretske, Lycan, Tye) usually take one or another of these theories to provide an explanation of the (Non-conceptual) content of experiential states. They thus tend to be Externalists, about phenomenological as well as conceptual content. Phenomenalists and non-deductive representationalists (Block, Chalmers, Loar, Peacocke, Siewert), on the other hand, take it that the representational content of such states is (at least in part) determined by their intrinsic phenomenal properties. Further, those who advocate a phenomenology-based approach to conceptual content (Horgan and Tiensen, Loar, Pitt, Searle, Siewert) also seem to be committed to Internalist individuation of the content (if not the reference) of such states.
Generally, those who, like informational theorists, think relations to one's (natural or social) environment are (at least partially) determinative of the content of mental representations are Externalists (e.g., Burge 1979, 1986, McGinn 1977, Putnam 1975), whereas those who, like some proponents of functional theories, think representational content is determined by an individual's intrinsic properties alone, are internalists (or individualists).
This issue is widely taken to be of central importance, since psychological explanation, whether commonsense or scientific, is supposed to be both causal and content-based. (Beliefs and desires cause the behaviours they do because they have the contents they do. For example, the desire that one have a beer and the beliefs that there is beer in the refrigerator and that the refrigerator is in the kitchen may explain one's getting up and going to the kitchen.) If, however, a mental representation's having a particular content is due to factors extrinsic to it, it is unclear how its having that content could determine its causal powers, which, arguably, must be intrinsic. Some who accept the standard arguments for externalism have argued that internal factors determine a component of the content of a mental representation. They say that mental representations have both 'narrow' content (determined by intrinsic factors) and 'wide' or 'broad' content (determined by narrow content plus extrinsic factors). (This distinction may be applied to the sub-personal representations of cognitive science as well as to those of commonsense psychology.
Narrow content has been variously construed. Putnam (1975), Fodor (1982)), and Block (1986) for example, seems to understand it as something like dedictorial content (i.e., Frégean sense, or perhaps character, à la Kaplan 1989). On this construal, narrow content is context-independent and directly expressible. Fodor (1987) and Block (1986), however, has also characterized narrow content as radically inexpressible. On this construal, narrow content is a kind of proto-content, or content-determinant, and can be specified only indirectly, via specifications of context/wide-content pairings. Both, construe of as a narrow content and are characterized as functions from context to (wide) content. The narrow content of a representation is determined by properties intrinsic to it or its possessor such as its syntactic structure or its intra-mental computational or inferential role or its phenomenology.
Burge (1986) has argued that causation-based worries about externalist individuation of psychological content, and the introduction of the narrow notion, are misguided. Fodor (1994, 1998) has more recently urged that there may be no need to narrow its contentual representations, accountable for reasons of an ordering supply of naturalistic (causal) explanations of human cognition and action, since the sorts of cases they were introduced to handle, viz., Twin-Earth cases and Frége cases, are nomologically either impossible or dismissible as exceptions to non-strict psychological laws.
The leading contemporary version of the Representational Theory of Mind, the Computational Theory of Mind, claims that the brain is a kind of computer and that mental processes are computations. According to the computational theory of mind, cognitive states are constituted by computational relations to mental representations of various kinds, and cognitive processes are sequences of such states. The computational theory of mind and the representational theory of mind, may by attempting to explain all psychological states and processes in terms of mental representation. In the course of constructing detailed empirical theories of human and animal cognition and developing models of cognitive processes' implementable in artificial information processing systems, cognitive scientists have proposed a variety of types of mental representations. While some of these may be suited to be mental relata of commonsense psychological states, some - so-called 'subpersonal' or 'sub-doxastic' representations - are not. Though many philosophers believe that computational theory of mind can provide the best scientific explanations of cognition and behaviour, there is disagreement over whether such explanations will vindicate the commonsense psychological explanations of prescientific representational theory of mind.
According to Stich's (1983) Syntactic Theory of Mind, for example, computational theories of psychological states should concern themselves only with the formal properties of the objects those states are relations to. Commitment to the explanatory relevance of content, however, is for most cognitive scientists fundamental. That mental processes are computations, which computations are rule-governed sequences of semantically evaluable objects, and that the rules apply to the symbols in virtue of their content, are central tenets of mainstream cognitive science.
Explanations in cognitive science appeal to a many different kinds of mental representation, including, for example, the 'mental models' of Johnson-Laird 1983, the 'retinal arrays,' 'primal sketches' and '2½ -D sketches' of Marr 1982, the 'frames' of Minsky 1974, the 'sub-symbolic' structures of Smolensky 1989, the 'quasi-pictures' of Kosslyn 1980, and the 'interpreted symbol-filled arrays' of Tye 1991 - in addition to representations that may be appropriate to the explanation of commonsense
Psychological states. Computational explanations have been offered of, among other mental phenomena, belief.
The classicists hold that mental representations are symbolic structures, which typically have semantically evaluable constituents, and that mental processes are rule-governed manipulations of them that are sensitive to their constituent structure. The connectionists, hold that mental representations are realized by patterns of activation in a network of simple processors ('nodes') and that mental processes consist of the spreading activation of such patterns. The nodes themselves are, typically, not taken to be semantically evaluable; nor do the patterns have semantically evaluable constituents. (Though there are versions of Connectionism -, 'localist' versions - on which individual nodes are taken to have semantic properties (e.g., Ballard 1986, Ballard & Hayes 1984).) It is arguable, however, that localist theories are neither definitive nor representative of the Conceptionist program.
Classicists are motivated (in part) by properties thought seems to share with language. Jerry Alan Fodor's (1935-), Language of Thought Hypothesis, (Fodor 1975, 1987), according to which the system of mental symbols constituting the neural basis of thought is structured like a language, provides a well-worked-out version of the classical approach as applied to commonsense psychology. According to the language of a thought hypothesis, the potential infinity of complex representational mental states is generated from a finite stock of primitive representational states, in accordance with recursive formation rules. This combinatorial structure accounts for the properties of productivity and systematicity of the system of mental representations. As in the case of symbolic languages, including natural languages (though Fodor does not suppose either that the language of thought hypotheses explains only linguistic capacities or that only verbal creatures have this sort of cognitive architecture), these properties of thought are explained by appeal to the content of the representational units and their combinability into contentful complexes. That is, the semantics of both language and thought is compositional: the content of a complex representation is determined by the contents of its constituents and their structural configuration.
Connectionists are motivated mainly by a consideration of the architecture of the brain, which apparently consists of layered networks of interconnected neurons. They argue that this sort of architecture is unsuited to carrying out classical serial computations. For one thing, processing in the brain is typically massively parallel. In addition, the elements whose manipulation drive's computation in Conceptionist networks (principally, the connections between nodes) are neither semantically compositional nor semantically evaluable, as they are on the classical approach. This contrast with classical computationalism is often characterized by saying that representation is, with respect to computation, distributed as opposed to local: representation is local if it is computationally basic; and distributed if it is not. (Another way of putting this is to say that for classicists mental representations are computationally atomic, whereas for connectionists they are not.)
Moreover, connectionists argue that information processing as it occurs in Conceptionist networks more closely resembles some features of actual human cognitive functioning. For example, whereas on the classical view learning involves something like hypothesis formation and testing (Fodor 1981), on the Conceptionist model it is a matter of evolving distribution of 'weight' (strength) on the connections between nodes, and typically does not involve the formulation of hypotheses regarding the identity conditions for the objects of knowledge. The Conceptionist network is 'trained up' by repeated exposure to the objects it is to learn to distinguish; and, though networks typically require many more exposures to the objects than do humans, this seems to model at least one feature of this type of human learning quite well.
Further, degradation in the performance of such networks in response to damage is gradual, not sudden as in the case of a classical information processor, and hence more accurately models the loss of human cognitive function as it typically occurs in response to brain damage. It is also sometimes claimed that Conceptionist systems show the kind of flexibility in response to novel situations typical of human cognition - situations in which classical systems are relatively 'brittle' or 'fragile.'
Some philosophers have maintained that Connectionism entails that there are no propositional attitudes. Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1990) have argued that if Conceptionist models of cognition are basically correct, then there are no discrete representational states as conceived in ordinary commonsense psychology and classical cognitive science. Others, however (e.g., Smolensky 1989), hold that certain types of higher-level patterns of activity in a neural network may be roughly identified with the representational states of commonsense psychology. Still others argue that language-of-thought style representation is both necessary in general and realizable within Conceptionist architectures, collect the central contemporary papers in the classicist/Conceptionist debate, and provides useful introductory material as well.
Whereas Stich (1983) accepts that mental processes are computational, but denies that computations are sequences of mental representations, others accept the notion of mental representation, but deny that computational theory of mind provides the correct account of mental states and processes.
Van Gelder (1995) denies that psychological processes are computational. He argues that cognitive systems are dynamic, and that cognitive states are not relations to mental symbols, but quantifiable states of a complex system consisting of (in the case of human beings) a nervous system, a body and the environment in which they are embedded. Cognitive processes are not rule-governed sequences of discrete symbolic states, but continuous, evolving total states of dynamic systems determined by continuous, simultaneous and mutually determining states of the systems components. Representation in a dynamic system is essentially information-theoretic, though the bearers of information are not symbols, but state variables or parameters.
Horst (1996), on the other hand, argues that though computational models may be useful in scientific psychology, they are of no help in achieving a philosophical understanding of the intentionality of commonsense mental states. Computational theory of mind attempts to reduce the intentionality of such states to the intentionality of the mental symbols they are relations to. But, Horst claims, the relevant notion of symbolic content is essentially bound up with the notions of convention and intention. So the computational theory of mind involves itself in a vicious circularity: the very properties that are supposed to be reduced are (tacitly) appealed to in the reduction.
To say that a mental object has semantic properties is, paradigmatically, to say that it may be about, or be true or false of, an object or objects, or that it may be true or false simpliciter. Suppose I think that you took to sniffing snuff. I am thinking about you, and if what I think of you (that they take snuff) is true of you, then my thought is true. According to representational theory of mind such states are to be explained as relations between agents and mental representations. To think that you take snuff is to token in some way a mental representation whose content is that ocelots take snuff. On this view, the semantic properties of mental states are the semantic properties of the representations they are relations to.
Linguistic acts seem to share such properties with mental states. Suppose I say that you take snuff. I am talking about you, and if what I say of you (that they take snuff) is true of them, then my utterance is true. Now, to say that you take snuff is (in part) to utter a sentence that means that you take snuff. Many philosophers have thought that the semantic properties of linguistic expressions are inherited from the intentional mental states they are conventionally used to express. On this view, the semantic properties of linguistic expressions are the semantic properties of the representations that are the mental relata of the states they are conventionally used to express.
It is also widely held that in addition to having such properties as reference, truth-conditions and truth - so-called extensional properties - expressions of natural languages also have intensional properties, in virtue of expressing properties or propositions - i.e., in virtue of having meanings or senses, where two expressions may have the same reference, truth-conditions or truth value, yet express different properties or propositions (Frége 1892/1997). If the semantic properties of natural-language expressions are inherited from the thoughts and concepts they express (or vice versa, or both), then an analogous distinction may be appropriate for mental representations.
Theories of representational content may be classified according to whether they are atomistic or holistic and according to whether they are externalistic or internalistic, whereby, emphasizing the priority of a whole over its parts. Furthermore, in the philosophy of language, this becomes the claim that the meaning of an individual word or sentence can only be understood in terms of its relation to an indefinitely larger body of language, such as à whole theory, or even a whole language or form of life. In the philosophy of mind a mental state similarly may be identified only in terms of its relations with others. Moderate holism may allow the other things besides these relationships also count; extreme holism would hold that a network of relationships is all that we have. A holistic view of science holds that experience only confirms or disconfirms large bodies of doctrine, impinging at the edges, and leaving some leeway over the adjustment that it requires.
Once, again, in the philosophy of mind and language, the view that what is thought, or said, or experienced, is essentially dependent on aspects of the world external to the mind of the subject. The view goes beyond holding that such mental states are typically caused by external factors, to insist that they could not have existed as they now do without the subject being embedded in an external world of a certain kind. It is these external relations that make up the essence or identify of the mental state. Externalism is thus opposed to the Cartesian separation of the mental from the physical, since that holds that the mental could in principle exist as it does even if there were no external world at all. Various external factors have been advanced as ones on which mental content depends, including the usage of experts, the linguistic, norms of the community. And the general causal relationships of the subject. In the theory of knowledge, externalism is the view that a person might know something by being suitably situated with respect to it, without that relationship being in any sense within his purview. The person might, for example, be very reliable in some respect without believing that he is. The view allows that you can know without being justified in believing that you know.
However, atomistic theories take a representation's content to be something that can be specified independent entity of that representation' s relations to other representations. What the American philosopher of mind, Jerry Alan Fodor (1935-) calls the crude causal theory, for example, takes a representation to be a |cow| - a menial representation with the same content as the word 'cow' - if its tokens are caused by instantiations of the property of being-a-cow, and this is a condition that places no explicit constraints on how |cow|'s must or might relate to other representations. Holistic theories contrasted with atomistic theories in taking the relations à representation bears to others to be essential to its content. According to functional role theories, a representation is a |cow| if it behaves like a |cow| should behave in inference.
Internalist theories take the content of a representation to be a matter determined by factors internal to the system that uses it. Thus, what Block (1986) calls 'short-armed' functional role theories are Internalist. Externalist theories take the content of a representation to be determined, in part at least, by factors external to the system that uses it. Covariance theories, as well as telelogical theories that invoke an historical theory of functions, take content to be determined by 'external' factors. Crossing the atomist-holistic distinction with the Internalist-externalist distinction.
Externalist theories (sometimes called non-individualistic theories) have the consequence that molecule for molecule identical cognitive systems might yet harbour representations with different contents. This has given rise to a controversy concerning 'narrow' content. If we assume some form of externalist theory is correct, then content is, in the first instance 'wide' content, i.e., determined in part by factors external to the representing system. On the other hand, it seems clear that, on plausible assumptions about how to individuate psychological capacities, internally equivalent systems must have the same psychological capacities. Hence, it would appear that wide content cannot be relevant to characterizing psychological equivalence. Since cognitive science generally assumes that content is relevant to characterizing psychological equivalence, philosophers attracted to externalist theories of content have sometimes attempted to introduce 'narrow' content, i.e., an aspect or kind of content that is equivalent internally equivalent systems. The simplest such theory is Fodor's idea (1987) that narrow content is a function from contents (i.e., from whatever the external factors are) to wide contents.
All the same, what a person expresses by a sentence is often a function of the environment in which he or she is placed. For example, the disease I refer to by the term like 'arthritis', or the kind of tree I refer to as a 'Maple' will be defined by criteria of which I know next to nothing. This raises the possibility of imagining two persons in rather different environments, but in which everything appears the same to each of them. The wide content of their thoughts and sayings will be different if the situation surrounding them is appropriately different: 'situation' may include the actual objects they perceive or the chemical or physical kinds of object in the world they inhabit, or the history of their words, or the decisions of authorities on what counts as an example, of one of the terms they use. The narrow content is that part of their thought which remains identical, through their identity of the way things appear, regardless of these differences of surroundings. Partisans of wide content may doubt whether any content in this sense narrow, partisans of narrow content believer that it is the fundamental notion, with wide content being explicable in terms of narrow content plus context.
Even so, the distinction between facts and values has outgrown its name: it applies not only to matters of fact vs, matters of value, but also to statements that something is, vs. statements that something ought to be. Roughly, factual statements - 'is statements' in the relevant sense - represent some state of affairs as obtaining, whereas normative statements - evaluative, and deontic ones - attribute goodness to something, or ascribe, to an agent, an obligation to act. Neither distinction is merely linguistic. Specifying a book's monetary value is making a factual statement, though it attributes a kind of value. 'That is a good book' expresses a value judgement though the term 'value' is absent (nor would 'valuable' be synonymous with 'good'). Similarly, 'we are morally obligated to fight' superficially expresses a statement, and 'By all indications it ough to rain' makes a kind of ought-claim; but the former is an ought-statement, the latter an (epistemic) is-statement.
Theoretical difficulties also beset the distinction. Some have absorbed values into facts holding that all value is instrumental, roughly, to have value is to contribute - in a factual analysable way - to something further which is (say) deemed desirable. Others have suffused facts with values, arguing that facts (and observations) are 'theory-impregnated' and contending that values are inescapable to theoretical choice. But while some philosophers doubt that fact/value distinctions can be sustained, there persists a sense of a deep difference between evaluating, and attributing an obligation and, on the other hand, saying how the world is.
Fact/value distinctions, may be defended by appeal to the notion of intrinsic value, as a thing has in itself and thus independently of its consequences. Roughly, a value statement (proper) is an ascription of intrinsic value, one to the effect that a thing is to some degree good in itself. This leaves open whether ought-statements are implicitly value statements, but even if they imply that something has intrinsic value - e.g., moral value - they can be independently characterized, say by appeal to rules that provide (justifying) reasons for action. One might also ground the fact value distinction in the attributional (or even motivational) component apparently implied by the making of valuational or deontic judgements: Thus, 'it is a good book, but that is no reason for a positive attribute towards it' and 'you ought to do it, but there is no reason to' seem inadmissible, whereas, substituting, 'an expensive book' and 'you will do it' yields permissible judgements. One might also argue that factual judgements are the kind which are in principle appraisable scientifically, and thereby anchor the distinction on the factual side. This ligne is plausible, but there is controversy over whether scientific procedures are 'value-free' in the required way.
Philosophers differ regarding the sense, if any, in which epistemology is normative (roughly, valuational). But what precisely is at stake in this controversy is no clearly than the problematic fact/value distinction itself. Must epistemologists as such make judgements of value or epistemic responsibility? If epistemology is naturalizable, then even epistemic principles simply articulate under what conditions - say, appropriate perceptual stimulations - a belief is justified, or constitutes knowledge. Its standards of justification, then would be like standards of, e.g., resilience for bridges. It is not obvious, however, that there appropriate standards can be established without independent judgements that, say, a certain kind of evidence is good enough for justified belief (or knowledge). The most plausible view may be that justification is like intrinsic goodness, though it supervenes on natural properties, it cannot be analysed wholly in factual statements.
Thus far, belief has been depicted as being all-or-nothing, however, as a resulting causality for which we have grounds for thinking it true, and, all the same, its acceptance is governed by epistemic norms, and, least of mention, it is partially subject to voluntary control and has functional affinities to belief. Still, the notion of acceptance, like that of degrees of belief, merely extends the standard picture, and does not replace it.
Traditionally, belief has been of epistemological interest in its propositional guise: 'S' believes that 'p', where 'p' is a reposition towards which an agent, 'S' exhibits an attitude of acceptance. Not all belief is of this sort. If I trust you to say, I believer you. And someone may believe in Mr. Radek, or in a free-market economy, or in God. It is sometimes supposed that all belief is 'reducible' to propositional belief, belief-that. Thus, my believing you might be thought a matter of my believing, is, perhaps, that what you say is true, and your belief in free markets or God, is a matter of your believing that free-market economies are desirable or that God exists.
Some philosophers have followed St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), in supposing that to believer in God is simply to believer that certain truths hold while others argue that belief-in is a distinctive attitude, on that includes essentially an element of trust. More commonly, belief-in has been taken to involve a combination of propositional belief together with some further attitude.
The moral philosopher Richard Price (1723-91) defends the claim that there are different sorts of belief-in, some, but not all reducible to beliefs-that. If you believer in God, you believer that God exists, that God is good, you believer that God is good, etc. But according to Price, your belief involves, in addition, a certain complex pro-attitude toward its object. Even so, belief-in outruns the evidence for the corresponding belief-that. Does this diminish its rationality? If belief-in presupposes believes-that, it might be thought that the evidential standards for the former must be, at least, as high as standards for the latter. And any additional pro-attitude might be thought to require a further layer of justification not required for cases of belief-that.
Belief-in may be, in general, less susceptible to alternations in the face of unfavourable evidence than belief-that. A believer who encounters evidence against God's existence may remain unshaken in his belief, in part because the evidence does not bear on his pro-attitude. So long as this ids united with his belief that God exists, and reasonably so - in a way that an ordinary propositional belief that would not.
The correlative way of elaborating on the general objection to justificatory externalism challenges the sufficiency of the various externalist conditions by citing cases where those conditions are satisfied, but where the believers in question seem intuitively not to be justified. In this context, the most widely discussed examples have to do with possible occult cognitive capacities, like clairvoyance. Considering the point in application once, again, to reliabilism, the claim is that to think that he has such a cognitive power, and, perhaps, even good reasons to the contrary, is not rational or responsible and therefore not epistemically justified in accepting the belief that result from his clairvoyance, dispite the fact that the reliablist condition is satisfied.
One sort of response to this latter sorts of an objection is to 'bite the bullet' and insist that such believers are in fact justified, dismissing the seeming intuitions to the contrary as latent Internalist prejudice. A more widely adopted response attempts to impose additional conditions, usually of a roughly Internalist sort, which will rule out the offending example, while stopping far of a full internalism. But, while there is little doubt that such modified versions of externalism can handle particular cases, as well enough to avoid clear intuitive implausibility, the usually problematic cases that they cannot handle, and also whether there is and clear motivation for the additional requirements other than the general Internalist view of justification that externalist is committed to reject.
A view in this same general vein, one that might be described as a hybrid of internalism and externalism holds that epistemic justification requires that there is a justicatory factor that is cognitively accessible to the believer in question (though it need not be actually grasped), thus ruling out, e.g., a pure reliabilism. At the same time, however, though it must be objectively true that beliefs for which such a factor is available are likely to be true, in addition, the fact need not be in any way grasped or cognitively accessible to the believer. In effect, of the premises needed to argue that a particular belief is likely to be true, one must be accessible in a way that would satisfy at least weak internalism, the Internalist will respond that this hybrid view is of no help at all in meeting the objection and has no belief nor is it held in the rational, responsible way that justification intuitively seems to require, for the believer in question, lacking one crucial premise, still has no reason at all for thinking that his belief is likely to be true.
An alternative to giving an externalist account of epistemic justification, one which may be more defensible while still accommodating many of the same motivating concerns, is to give an externalist account of knowledge directly, without relying on an intermediate account of justification. Such a view will obviously have to reject the justified true belief account of knowledge, holding instead that knowledge is true belief which satisfies the chosen externalist condition, e.g., a result of a reliable process (and perhaps, further conditions as well). This makes it possible for such a view to retain Internalist account of epistemic justification, though the centrality of that concept to epistemology would obviously be seriously diminished.
Such an externalist account of knowledge can accommodate the commonsense conviction that animals, young children, and unsophisticated adults' posse's knowledge, though not the weaker conviction (if such a conviction does exist) that such individuals are epistemically justified in their beliefs. It is, at least, less vulnerable to Internalist counter-examples of the sort discussed, since the intuitions involved there pertain more clearly to justification than to knowledge. What is uncertain is what ultimate philosophical significance the resulting conception of knowledge, for which is accepted or advanced as true or real on the basis of less than conclusive evidence, as can only be assumed to have. In particular, does it have any serious bearing on traditional epistemological problems and on the deepest and most troubling versions of scepticism, which seems in fact to be primarily concerned with justification, and knowledge?`
A rather different use of the terms 'internalism' and 'externalism' have to do with the issue of how the content of beliefs and thoughts is determined: According to an Internalist view of content, the content of such intention states depends only on the non-relational, internal properties of the individual's mind or grain, and not at all on his physical and social environment: While according to an externalist view, content is significantly affected by such external factors and suggests a view that appears of both internal and external elements are standardly classified as an external view.
As with justification and knowledge, the traditional view of content has been strongly Internalist in character. The main argument for externalism derives from the philosophy y of language, more specifically from the various phenomena pertaining to natural kind terms, indexicals, etc. that motivate the views that have come to be known as 'direct reference' theories. Such phenomena seem at least to show that the belief or thought content that can be properly attributed to a person is dependant on facts about his environment, e.g., whether he is on Earth or Twin Earth, what is fact pointing at, the classificatory criterion employed by expects in his social group, etc. - not just on what is going on internally in his mind or brain.
An objection to externalist account of content is that they seem unable to do justice to our ability to know the content of our beliefs or thought 'from the inside', simply by reflection. If content is depending on external factors pertaining to the environment, then knowledge of content should depend on knowledge of these factors - which will not in general be available to the person whose belief or thought is in question.
The adoption of an externalist account of mental content would seem to support an externalist account of justification, apart from all contentful representation is a belief inaccessible to the believer, then both the justifying statuses of other beliefs in relation to that of the same representation are the status of that content, being totally rationalized by further beliefs for which it will be similarly inaccessible. Thus, contravening the Internalist requirement for justification, as an Internalist must insist that there are no justification relations of these sorts, that our internally associable content can also not be warranted or as stated or indicated without the deviated departure from a course or procedure or from a norm or standard in showing no deviation from traditionally held methods of justification exacting by anything else: But such a response appears lame unless it is coupled with an attempt to show that the externalised account of content is mistaken.
Except for alleged cases of thing s that are evident for one just by being true, it has often been thought, anything is known must satisfy certain criteria as well as being true. Except for alleged cases of self-evident truths, it is often thought that anything that is known must satisfy certain criteria or standards. These criteria are general principles that will make a proposition evident or just make accepting it warranted to some degree. Common suggestions for this role include position ‘p', e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4, ‘p' is evident or, if ‘p' coheres wit h the bulk of one's beliefs, ‘p' is warranted. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truths, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceive s ‘p', ‘transmit' the status as evident they already have without criteria to other proposition s like ‘p', or they might be criteria whereby purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g., facts about logical connections or about conception that need not be already evident or warranted, originally ‘create' p's epistemic status. If that in turn can be ‘transmitted' to other propositions, e.g., by deduction or induction, there will be criteria specifying when it is.
Nonetheless, of or relating to tradition a being previously characterized or specified to convey an idea indirectly, as an idea or theory for consideration and being so extreme a design or quality and lean towards an ecocatorial suggestion that implicate an involving responsibility that include: (1) if a proposition ‘p', e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4, is clearly and distinctly conceived, then ‘p' is evident, or simply, (2) if we can't conceive ‘p' to be false, then ‘p' is evident: Or, (3) whenever are immediately conscious o f in thought or experience, e.g,, that we seem to see red, is evident. These might be criteria whereby putative self-evident truth s, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceives, e.g., that one clearly and distinctly conceives ‘p', ‘transmit' the status as evident they already have for one without criteria to other propositions like ‘p'. Alternatively, they might be criteria whereby epistemic status, e.g., p's being evident, is originally created by purely non-epistemic considerations, e.g., facts about how ‘p' is conceived which are neither self-evident is already criterial evident.
The result effect, holds that traditional criteria do not seem to make evident propositions about anything beyond our own thoughts, experiences and necessary truths, to which deductive or inductive criteria ma y be applied. Moreover, arguably, inductive criteria, including criteria warranting the best explanation of data, never make things evident or warrant their acceptance enough to count as knowledge.
Contemporary epistemologists suggest that traditional criteria may need alteration in three ways. Additional evidence may subject even our most basic judgements to rational correction, though they count as evident on the basis of our criteria. Warrant may be transmitted other than through deductive and inductive relations between propositions. Transmission criteria might not simply ‘pass' evidence on linearly from a foundation of highly evident ‘premisses' to ‘conclusions' that are never more evident.
A group of statements, some of which purportedly provide support for another. The statements which purportedly provide the support are the premisses while the statement purportedly support is the conclusion. Arguments are typically divided into two categories depending on the degree of support they purportedly provide. Deductive arguments purportedly provide conclusive support for their conclusions while inductively supports the purported provision that inductive arguments purportedly provided only arguments purportedly in the providing probably of support. Some, but not all, arguments succeed in providing support for their conclusions. Successful deductive arguments are valid while successful inductive arguments are valid while successful inductive arguments are strong. An argument is valid just in case if all its premisses are true its conclusion is only probably true. Deductive logic provides methods for ascertaining whether or not an argument is valid whereas, inductive logic provides methods for ascertaining the degree of support the premisses of an argument confer on its conclusion.
Finally, proof, least of mention, is a collection of considerations and reasonings that instill and sustain conviction that some proposed theorem - the theorem proved - is not only true, but could not possibly be false. A perceptual observation may instill the conviction that water is cold. But a proof that 2 + 5 = 5 must not only instill the conviction that is true that 2 + 3 = 5, but also that 2 + 3 could not be anything but the digit 5.
No one has succeeded in replacing this largely psychological characterization of proofs by a more objective characterization. The representations of reconstructions of proofs as mechanical and semiotical derivation in formal-logical systems all but completely fail to capture ‘proofs' as mathematicians are quite content to give them. For example, formal-logical derivations depend solely on the logical form of the considered proposition, whereas usually proofs depend in large measure on content of propositions other than their logical form
No one has succeeded in replacing this largely psychological characterization of proofs by a more objective characterization. The representations of reconstructions of proofs as mechanical and semiotical derivation in formal-logical systems all but completely fail to capture ‘proofs' as mathematicians are quite content to give them, fas or example, formal-logical .
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Can we go beyond the sciebtific mode of explor ation and come to know the real natur e of the smallest constitutent unit s of the ub=niverse? We learn frpom PLato that there are different levels of knowledge, which can be contempation. The conclusions of discursive reasoning, which functions in the subject/object mode, the insight it brings come with 'utter certsinty'. when an insight is formulatrd, however, the certainty is lost. neverthless, the combined results of contemplation and discursive reasoning can lead to the creation of magnificent conceptual structures.
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The function of insight gives a transcendental content that, when reduced to an interpretative system, becomes subject to the relativity of all subject-object consciousness, therefore, there can be no such thing as an infallible interpretation. Thus we must distinguish between insights and its formulation.
In recent decades, another branch of evolutionary theory has appeared, as researchers have explored the possibility that not only physical traits, but behaviour itself, might be inherited. Behavioural geneticists have studied how genes influence behaviour, and more recently, the role of biology in social behaviour has been explored. This field of investigation, known as Sociobiology, was inaugurated in 1975 with the publication of the book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis by American evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson. In this book, Wilson proposed that genes influence much of the animals and humanizing behaviours, and, least of mention, that these characteristics are also subject to natural selection.
Sociobiologists examine animal behaviours called altruistic, that is, unselfish, or demonstrating concern for the welfare of others. When birds feed on the ground, for example, one individual may notice a predator and sound an alarm. In so doing, the bird also calls the predator's attention to itself. What can account for the behaviour of such a sentry, who seems to derive no evolutionary benefit from its unselfish behaviour and so seem to defy the laws of natural selection?
Darwin was aware of altruistic social behaviour in animals, and of how this phenomenon challenged his theory of natural selection. Among the different types of bees in a colony, for example, worker bees are responsible for collecting food, defending the colony, and caring for the nest and the young, but they are sterile and create no offspring. Only by her, that the beehive area of infactoring takes apart that which only the queen bee has inherently given that which she could reproduce. If natural selection rewards those who have the highest reproductive success, how could sterile worker bees come about by natural selection when worker bees devote themselves to others and do not reproduce?
Scientists now recognize that among social insects, such as bees, wasps, and ants, the sterile workers are more closely related genetically to one another and to their fertile sisters, the queens, than brothers and sisters are among other organisms. By helping to protect or nurture their sisters, the sterile worker's bees preserve their own genes more so than if they reproduced themselves. Thus, the altruistic behaviour evolved by natural selection.
Evolutionary theory has undergone many further refinements in recent years. One such theory challenges the central idea that evolution goes on by gradual change. In 1972 the American paleontologist's Stephen Jay Gould and Niles' Eldredge proposed the theory of punctuated equilibria. According to this theory, trends in the fossil record cannot be attributed to gradual transformation within a lineage, but result from quick bursts of rapid evolutionary change. In Darwinian theory, new species arise by gradual, but not necessarily uniform, accumulation of many small genetic changes over long periods of geologic time. In the fossil record, however, new species generally appear suddenly after long periods of the stasis-that are, no change. Gould and Eldredge recognized that Speciation more likely occurs in small, isolated, peripheral populations than in the main population of the species, and that the unchanging nature of large populations contributes to the stasis of most fossil species over millions of years. Occasionally, when conditions are right, the equilibrium state becomes ‘punctuated' by one or more Speciation events. While these events probably require thousands or tens of thousands of years to establish effective reproductive isolation and distinctive characteristics, this is but an instant in geologic time compared with an average life span of more than ten million years for most fossil species. Proponents of this theory envision a trend in evolutionary development to be more like climbing a flight of stairs (punctuations followed by stasis) than rolling up an inclined plane.
In the last several decades, scientists have questioned the role of extinction in evolution. Of the millions of species that have existed on this planet, more than 99 percent are extinct. Historically, biologists regarded extinction as a natural outcome of competition between newly evolved adaptively superior species and they are older, more primitive ancestors. Recently, however, paleontologists have discovered that many different, unrelated species living in, and large ecosystems tend to become extinct at nearly the same time. The cause is always some sort of climate change or catastrophic event that produces conditions too severe for most organisms to endure. Moreover, new species evolve after the wave of extinction removes many species that previously occupied a region for millions of years. Thus extinction does not result from evolution, but causes it.
Scientists have identified several instances of mass extinction, when species apparently died out on a huge scale. The greatest of these episodes occurred during the end of the Permian Period, by some odd 245 million years ago. Then, according to estimates, more then 95 percent of species, nearly all life on the planet-died out. Another extensively studied, but extinction took place at the boundary of the Cretaceous Period and the Tertiary Period, roughly sixty-five million years ago, when the dinosaurs disappeared. In all, more than twenty global mass extinctions have been identified. Some scientists theorize that such events may even be cyclical, occurring at regular intervals.
In that made or broke into the genetic chain no less the chromosomal cells that carry the DNA and inhibiting functions in the transmission of hereditary information, for which the helical hereditary information is necessary for cell growth.
Other theories have entered on abrupt changes in the levels of the world's oceans, for example, or on the effect of changing salinity on early sea life. Another theory blames catastrophic events for mass extinction. Strong evidence, for example, supports the theory that a meteorite some 10 km. (6 mi.) in diameter struck the Earth 65 million years in the past. The dust cloud from the collision, according to this impact theory, shrouded the Earth for months, blocking the sunlight that plants need to survive. Without plants to eat, the dinosaurs and many other species of land animals were wiped out.
Extinction as a cause of evolution rather than the result of it is perhaps best shown as for our own ancestors,-ancient mammals. During the time of the dinosaurs, mammals made up only several the animals that roamed the planet. The demise of dinosaurs provided an opportunity for mammals to expand their numbers and ultimately to become the dominant land animal. Without the catastrophe that took place sixty-five million years into the past, mammals may have remained in the shadow of the dinosaurs is not exclusively a natural phenomenon. For thousands of years, as the human species has grown in number and technological sophistication, we have shown our power to cause extinction and to upset the world's ecological balance. In North America alone, for example, about forty species of birds and more than thirty-five species of mammals have become extinct in the last few hundred years, mostly from human activity. Humans default upon the plants and animals by their extermination through their relentless hunting or harvesting them. What is more, by destroying and replacing their habitat with farms and other forms of development, they also have allowed to introduce the foreign species that hunt or compete with local species, and by poisoning them with chemicals and other pollutants.
The rain forests of South America and other tropical regions offer a particularly troubling scenario. Upwards of fifty million acres of rain forest disappear every year as humans raze trees to make room for agriculture and livestock. Given that a single acre of rain forest may contain thousands of irreplaceable species of plant and animal life, the threat to bio-diversity is severe. The conservation of wildlife is now an international concern, as evidenced by treaties and agreements enacted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. In the United States, federal laws protect endangered species. The problem, nonetheless, of dwindling bio-diversity seems certain to worsen as the human population continues to expand, and no one knows for sure how it will affect evolution.
Advances in medical technology may also affect natural selection. The study from the mid-20th century showing that babies of medium birth weights were more likely to survive than their heavier or lighter counterparts would be difficult to reproduce today. Advances in neonatal medical technology have made it possible for small or premature babies to survive in a great deal higher of numbers.
Recent genetic analysis shows the human population contains harmful mutations in unprecedented levels. Researchers attribute this to genetic drift acting on small human populations throughout history. They also expect that improved medical technology may exacerbate the problem. Better medicine enables more people to survive to reproductive age, even if they carry mutations that in past generations would have caused their early death. The genetic repercussions of this are still unknown, but biologists speculate that many minor problems, such as poor eyesight, headaches, and stomach upsets may be attributable to our collection of harmful mutations.
Humans have also developed the potential to affect evolution at the most basic level,-the genes. The techniques of genetic engineering have become commonplace. Scientists can extract genes from living things, alter them by combining them with another segment of DNA, and then place this recombinant DNA back inside the organism. Genetic engineering has produced pest-resistant crops and larger cows and other livestock. To an increasing extent, genetic engineers fight human disease, such as cancer and heart disease. The investigation of gene therapy, in which scientists substitute functioning copies of a given gene for a defective gene, is an active field of medicine, and that in this way the tinkering with genetic material will affect evolutionary remains, yet to be determined.
The most contentious debates over evolution have involved religion. From Darwin's day to the present, members of some religious faiths have perceived the scientific theory of evolution to be in direct and objectionable conflict with religious doctrine regarding the creation of the world. Most religious denominations, however, see no conflict between the scientific study of evolution and religious teachings about creation. Christian Fundamentalists and others who believe literally in the biblical story of creation choose to reject evolutionary theory because it contradicts the book of Genesis, which describes how God created the world and all its plant and animal life in six days. Many such people maintain that the Earth is comparatively young-perhaps 6,000 to 8,000 years old-and that humans and all the worlds' species have remained unchanged since their recent creation by a divine hand.
Opponents of evolution argue that only a divine intelligence, and not some comparatively random, undirected process, could have created the variety of the world's species, not to mention an organism as complex as a human being. Some people are upset by the oversimplification that humans evolved from monkeys. In the eyes of some, a divine being placed humans apart from the animal world. Proponents of this view find any attempt to place humans within the context of natural history deeply insulting.
For decades, the teaching of evolution in schools has been a flash point in the conflict between religious fundamentalism and science. During the 1920's, Fundamentalists lobbied against the teaching of evolution in public schools. Four states-Arkansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Tennessee-passed laws outlawing public-school instruction in the principles of Darwinian evolution. In 1925 John Scopes, a biology teacher in Dayton, Tennessee, assigned his students readings about Darwinism, in direct violation of state law. Scopes was arrested and placed on trial. In what was the major trial of its time, American defence attorney Clarence Darrow represented Scopes, while American politician William Jennings Bryan argued for the prosecution. Ultimately, Scopes was convicted and customarily received a small fine. However, the ‘Monkey Trial,' as it became called, was seen as a victory for evolution, since Darrow, in cross examining Bryan, succeeded in pointing out several serious inconsistencies in Fundamentalists belief.
Laws against the teaching of evolution were upheld for another forty years, until the Supreme Court of the United States, in a 1968 decision in the case Epperson V. Arkansas, ruled that such laws were an unconstitutional violation of the legally required separation of church and state. Over the next few years, Fundamentalists responded by de-emphasizing the religious content in their doctrine and instead casting their arguments as a scientific alternative to evolution called creation science, now also called intelligent design theory. In response to Fundamentalist pressure, twenty-six states debated laws that would require teachers to spend equal amounts of time teaching creation science and evolution. Only two states, Arkansas and Louisiana, passed such laws. The Arkansas law was struck down in federal district court, while proponents of the Louisiana law appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. In its 1987 decision in Edwards v Aquillard, the Court struck down such equal time laws, ruling that creation science is a religious idea and thus an illegal violation of the church-state separation. Despite these rulings, school board members and other government officials continue to grapple with the long-standing debate between creation and evolution scientists. Even so, efforts to permit the teaching of intelligent design theory in public schools have been unsuccessfully as scientists have sought-and found-evidence for evolution. The fossil record demonstrates that life on this planet was vastly different millions of years ago. Fossils, furthermore, provide evidence of how species change over time. The study of comparative anatomy has highlighted physical similarities in the features of widely different species-proof of common ancestry. Bacteria that mutate and develop resistance to antibiotics, along with other observable instances of adaptation, demonstrate evolutionary principles at work. The study of genes, proteins, and other molecular evidence has added to the understanding of evolutionary descent and the relationship among all living things. Research in all these areas has led to overwhelming support for evolution among scientists.
Nevertheless, evolutionary theory is still, in some cases, the cause of misconception or misunderstanding. People often misconstrue the phrase ‘survival of the fittest'. Some people interpret this to mean that survival is the reward for the strongest, the most vigorous, or the most dominant. In the Darwinian sense, however, fitness does not necessarily mean strength so much as the capacity to adapt successfully. This might mean developing adaptations for more efficiently obtaining food, or escaping predators, or enduring climate change-in short, for thriving in a given set of circumstances.
Yet it bears repeating that organisms do not change their characteristics in direct response to the environment. The key is genetic variation within a population,-and the potential for new combinations of traits. Nature will select those individuals that have developed the ideal characteristics with which to flourish in a given environment or niche. These individuals will have the greatest degree of reproductive success, passing their successful traits onto their descendants.
Another misconception is that evolution always progresses to better creatures. In fact, if species become too narrowly adapted to a given environment, they may ultimately lose the genetic variation necessary to survive sudden changes. Evolution, in such cases, will lead to extinction.
Once upon a time, in Human Evolution, now considered as pensively the process though which a lengthy period of change is admissively given by people who have originated from apelike ancestors. Scientific evidence shows that the physical and behavioural traits shared by all people evolved over a period of at least six million years.
One of the earliest defining human traits, Bipedalism -
walking on two legs as the primary form of locomotion-undergoing an evolution of more than four million years ago. Other important human characteristics'-such as a large and complex brain, the ability to make and use tools, and the capacity for language-developed more recently. Many advanced traits',-including complex symbolic expression, such as art, and elaborate cultural diversity-emerged mainly during the past 100,000 years.
Our closest living relatives are three surviving species of great apes: the gorilla, the common chimpanzee, and the pygmy chimpanzee (also known as bonobo). Their confinement to Africa, along with abundant fossils evidence, suggests that the earliest stages of human evolution were also played out in Africa, human history, as sometimes separate from the history of animals, took the initiative in that location about seven million years ago (estimated range from five to nine million years ago). Around that time, a population of African apes split into several populations, of which one went on to evolve into modern gorillas, a second into the two modern chimps, and the third into humans. The gorilla line apparently split before the split between the chimp and the human lines.
Fossils indicate that the evolutionary line leading to us had achieved an upright posture by around four million years ago, then began to increase in body size and in relative brain size around 2.5 million years ago. That protohuman is generally known as Australopithecus africaanus. Homo habilis, and Homo erectus, which apparently evolved into each other in that sequence. Although the Homo erectus, the stage extends to around 1.7 million years ago, was close to us modern humans in body size, its brain size was still barely half of ours. Stone tools became common around 2.5 million years ago, but they were merely the crudest of flaked or battered stones. In zoological significance and distinction, The Homo erectus was more than an ape, but still much less than a modern human.
All of that human history, for the first five or six million years after our origins about seven million years ago, remained confined to Africa. The first human ancestor to spread beyond Africa was The Homo erectus, as it is attested by fossils discovered on the Southeast Asian island of Java and conventionally known as Java man the oldest Java ‘man': archeological remains-of course, they may have belonged to a Java woman,-have usually been argued that they date from about a million years ago. However, it has recently been argued that they date from 1.8 million years ago. (Strictly speaking, the name Homo erectus belongs to these Javan fossils, and the African fossils classified as Homo erectus may warrant a different name). At present, the earliest unquestioned evidence for humans in Europe stems from around half a million years ago, but there are claims of an earlier presence. One would assume that the colonization of Asia also permitted the simultaneous colonization of Europe, since Eurasia is a single landmass not bisected by major barriers.
Nearly half a million years ago, human fossils had diverged from older Homo erectus skeletons in, they're enlarged, rounder, and fewer angular skulls. African and European skulls of half a million years ago were sufficiently similar to skulls of a modern that they are classified in our species, Homo sapiens, instead of in Homo erectus. This distinction is arbitrary, since The Homo erectus evolved into The Homo sapiens. However, these early Homo sapiens still differed from us in skeletal details, had brains significantly smaller than ours, and were grossly different from us in their artifacts and behaviour. Modern stone-tool-making peoples, such as Yali's great grandparents, would have scorned the stone tools of a half million years ago as very crude. The only significant addition to our ancestor's cultural repertoire that can be documented with confidence around that time was the use of fire.
No art, bone tools, or anything else has come down to us from an early Homo sapiens except their skeletal remains, and those crude stone tools, there were still no humans in Australia, because it would have taken boats to get there from Southern Asia. There were also no humans anywhere in the Americas, because that would have required the occupation of the nearest part of the Eurasian continent (Siberia), and possibly boat-building skills as well. (The present, shallow Bering Strait separating Siberia from Alaska, alternated between a strait and a broad intercontinental bridge of dry land, as sea level repeatedly rose and fell during the Ice Ages). Nevertheless, boat building and survival in cold Siberia were both far beyond the capabilities of an early Homo sapiens. After half a million years ago, the human population of Africa and western Eurasia proceeded to diverge from each other and from East Asia populations in skeletal details. The population of Europe and western Asia between 130,000 and 40,000 years ago is recreated by especially many skeletons' known as Neanderthals and sometimes classified as some separate spacies,
Yet their stone tools were still crude by comparison with modern New Guineans' polished stone axes and were usually not yet made in standardized diverse shapes, each with a clearly recognizable function.
The few preserved African skeletal fragments contemporary with the Neanderthals are more similar to our modern skeletons than do Neanderthal skeletons. Even fewer preserved East Asian skeletal fragments are known, but they appear different again from both Africans and Neanderthals. As for the lifestyle at that time, the best-preserved evidence comes from stone artifacts and animal bones accumulated at southern African sites. Although those Africans of 100,000 years ago had more modern skeletons than did their Neanderthal contemporized, they made especially the same crude stone toots as Neanderthals, still lacking standardized shapes. They had no preserved art. To judge from the bone evidence of animal species under which their targeted prey and hunting skills were unimpressive and mainly directed at easy-to-kill, not-at-all-dangerous animals. They were not yet in the business of slaughtering buffalo, pig, and other dangerous prey. They could not even catch fish: their sites immediately on the seacoast lack fish bones and fishhook. They and their Neanderthal contemporaries still rank as less than fully human.
While Neanderthals lived in glacial times and were adapted to the cold, they penetrated no farther north than northern Germany and Kiev. Nonetheless, Neanderthals apparently lacked needles, sewn clothing, warm houses, and other technology essential to survival in the coldest climates. Anatomically modern peoples who did posses such technology had expanded into Siberia by around 20,000 years ago (there are the usual much older disputed claims). That expansion may have been responsible for the extinction of Eurasia's wooly mammoth and wooly rhinoceroses likewise, to note, while the settlements of Australia/New Guinea, humans now occupied three of the five habitable continents, least that we omit Antarctica because it was not reached by humans until the 19th century and has never had any self-supporting human population. That left only two continents, North America and South America. For obvious reason that reaching the Americas from the Old world required boats (for which either there is no evidence even in Indonesia until 40,000 years ago and none in Europe until much later) to cross by sea, or else it required the occupation of Siberia (unoccupied until about 20,000 years ago) to cross the Bering Strait. However, it is uncertain when, between about 14,000 and 35,000 years ago, the Americas were first colonized.
Meanwhile, human history at last took off around 50,000 years ago, while of the easiest definite signs had come from East African sites with standardized stone tools and the first preserved jewellery (ostrich-shell beads). Similar developments soon appear in the Near East and in southeastern Europe, then (some 40,000 years ago) in southwestern Europe, where abundant artefacts are associated with fully modern skeletons of people termed Cro-Magnons. Thereafter, the garbage preserved at archaeological sites rapidly becomes ever more interesting and leaves no doubt that we are dealing with biologically and behaviourally modern human, however.
Cro-Magnons' garbage heaps yield not only stone tools but also tools of bone, whose suitability for shaping (for instance, into fish hooks) had apparently gone unrecognized by previous humans. Tools were produced in diverse. Distinctive shapes do modernly that their function as needles, awls, engraving tools, and so on are obvious to us. Instead of only single-piece tools such as hand-held scrapers, and multi-piece tools made their appearance. Recognizable multi-piece weapons at Cro-Magnon sites include harpoons, spear-throwers, and eventually bow and arrows, the precursors of rifles and other multi-piece modern weapons. Those efficient means of killing at a safe distance permitted the hunting of dangerous prey as rhinos and elephants, while the invention of rope for nets, lines, and snares allowed the addition of fish and bird to our diet. Remains of horses and sewn clothing testify to a greater improved ability to survive in cold climates, and remains of jewellery and carefully buried skeletons indicate revolutionary aesthetic and spiritual development.
Of the Cro-Magnons' products preserved, the best known are their artworks: Their magnificent cave paintings, statues, and musical instruments, which we still appreciate as art today. Anyone who has experienced firsthand the overwhelming power of the life-sized painted bulls and hoses in the Lascaux Cave of southern France will understand, if not imagine, that their creators must have been as modern in their minds as they were in their skeletons.
Obviously, some momentous change took place in our ancestors' capabilities between about 100,000 and 50,000 years ago. Presenting us with two major unresolved questions, regarding its triggering cause and its geographic location. As for its case, it can be argued for the perfection of the voiced box and hence for the anatomical basis of modern language, on which the exercise of human creativity is so dependent. Others have suggested instead that a change in brain organization around that time, without a change in brain size, made modern language possible.
As this occurring leap, and its location, did it take place primarily in one geographic area, in one group of humans, who were thereby enabled to expand and replace the former human populations of other parts of the world? Or did it occur in parallel in different regions, in each of which the human populations living today would be descendants of the populations living there before the connective leap? The conventionally advanced-looking human skull from Africa around 100,000 years ago has been taken to support the former view, within occurring specifically in Africa. Molecular studies (of so-called mitochondrial DNA) were initially also interpreted about an African origin of modern humans, though the meaning of those molecular findings is currently in doubt. On the other hand, skulls of humans living in China and Indonesia hundreds of thousands of years ago are considered by some physical anthropologists to exhibit features still found in modern Chinese and in Aboriginal Australians, respectfully. If true, that in the finding would suggest parallel evolution and multi-regional origins of modern humans, rather than origins in a single Garden of Eden. The issue remains unresolved.
The evidence for a localized origin of modern humans, followed by their spread and then their replacement of other types of humans elsewhere, seems strongly for Europe. Some 40,000 years ago, into Europe came the Cro-Magnons, with their modern skeleton, superior weapons, and other advanced cultural traits. Within a few thousand years there were no more Neanderthals, who had been evolving as the sole occupants of Europe for hundreds of thousands of years. The sequence strongly suggests that the modern Cro-Magnon somehow used their far superior technology, and their language skills or brains, to infect, kill, or displace the Neanderthals, leaving behind no evidence of hybridization between Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons.
Physical and genetic similarities show that the modern human species, Homo sapiens, has a very close relationship to another group of primate species, the apes. Humans and the so -called great apes (large apes) of Africa-chimpanzees (including bonobos, or so-called pygmy chimpanzees). Gorilla's,-share a common ancestor that lived sometime between eight million and six million years ago. The earliest humans evolved in Africa, and much of human evolution occurred on that continent. The fossils of early humans who lived between six million and two million years ago come entirely from Africa.
We should be reminded of the ways in which big domestic mammals were crucial to those human societies possessing them. Most notably, they provided meat, milk products, fertilizer, land transportation, leather, military assault, plow traction, and wool, and germs that killed previously unexposed peoples.
In addition, of course, small domestic mammals and domestic birds and insects have also been useful to humans. Many birds were domesticated for meat, eggs, and feathers: the chicken in China, various duck and goose species in parts of Eurasia, turkeys in Mesoamerica, guinea fowl in Africa, and the Muscovy duck in South America. Wolves were domesticated in Eurasia and North America to become our dogs used as hunting companions, sentinels, pets, and, in some societies, food. Rodent and other small mammals domesticated for food include the rabbit in Europe, the guinea pig in the Andes, a giant rat in West Africa, and possibly a rodent called the hutia on Caribbean islands. Ferrets were domesticated in Europe to hunt rabbits, and cats were domesticated in North Africa and Southern Asia to hunt rodent pests. Small mammals domesticated as recently as the 19th and 20th century include foxes, mink, and chinchillas grown for fur and hamsters as pets. Even some insects have been domesticated, not ably Europe's honeybee and China's silkworm moth, kept for hone y and silk, respectively.
Many of these small animals thus yielded food, clothing or warmth, but none of them pulled plows or wagons, none bore riders, none except dogs pulled sleds nor became war machines, and nine of them have been as important for food as have big domesticated mammals.
Most scientists distinguish among twelve to nineteen different species of early humans. Scientists do not all agree, however, about how the species are related or which ones simply died out. Many early human species',- probably most of them left no descendants. Scientists also debate over how to identify and classify particular species of early humans, and about what factors influenced the evolution and extinction of each species.
Early humans first migrated out of Africa into Asia probably between two million and 1.7 million years ago. They entered Europe later, generally within the past one million years. Species of modern humans populated many parts of the world much later. For instance, people first came to Australia probably within the past 60,000 years, and to the Americas within the past 35,000 years. The beginnings of agriculture and the rise of the first civilizations occurred within the past 10,000 years.
The scientific study of human evolution is called palaeanthropology. Palaeanthropology is a Studfield of anthropology, the study of human culture, society, and biology. Paleoanthropologists search for the roots of human physical traits and behaviour. They seek to discover how evolution has shaped the potentials, tendencies, and limitations of all people. For many people, palaeanthropology is an exciting scientific field because it illuminates the origins of the defining traits of the human species, and the fundamental connections between humans and other living organisms on Earth. Scientists have abundant evidence of human evolution from fossils, artifacts, and genetic studies. However, some people find the concept of human evolution troubling because it can seem to conflict with religious and other traditional beliefs about how people, other living things, and the world became. Yet many people have come to reconcile such beliefs with the scientific evidence.
All species of organisms originate through the process of biological evolution. In this process, new species arise from a series of natural changes. In animals that reproduce sexually, including humans, the term species refers to a group whose adult members regularly interbreed, resulting in fertile offspring,-that is, offspring themselves capable of reproducing. Scientists classify each species with a unique, and two-party scientific name. In this system, modern humans are classified as Homo sapiens.
The mechanism for evolutionary change resides in genes' - the basic units of heredity. Genes affect how the body and behaviour of an organism develop during its life. The information contained within the genes can reserve the change of a process known as mutation. The way particular genes are expressed,-how they affect the body or behaviour of an organism can also change. Over time, genetic change can alter a species overall way of life, such as what it eats, how it grows, and where it can live.
Genetic changes can improve the ability of organisms to survive, reproduce, and, in animals, raise offspring. This process is called adaptation. Parents pass adaptive genetic changes to their offspring, and ultimately these changes become common throughout a population-a group of organisms of the same species that share a particular local habitat. Many factors can favour new adaptations, but changes in the environment often play a role. Ancestral human species adapted to new environments as their genes changed, altering their anatomy (physical body structure) physiology (bodily functions, such as digestion, and behaviour). Over long periods, evolution dramatically transformed humans and their ways of life.
Geneticists estimate that the human line began to diverge from that of the African apes between eight million and five million years ago (paleontologists have dated the earliest human fossils to at least six million years ago). This figure comes from comparing differences in the genetic makeup of humans and apes, and then calculating how long it probably took for those differences to develop. Using similar techniques and comparing the genetic variations among human populations around the world, scientists have calculated that all people may share common genetic ancestors that lived sometime between 290,000 and 130,000 years ago.
Humans belong to the scientific order named Primates, a group of more than 230 species of mammals that also includes lemurs, lorises, tarsiers, monkeys, and apes. Modern humans, early humans, and other species of primates all have many similarities and some important differences. Knowledge of these similarities and differences helps scientists to understand the roots of many human traits, and the significance of each step in human evolution.
All primates, including humans, share at least part of a set of common characteristics that distinguish them from other mammals. Many of these characteristics evolved as adaptations for life in the trees, the environment in which earlier primates evolved. These include more reliance on sight than smell; overlapping fields of vision, allowing stereoscopic (three-dimensional) appearance; limbs and hands adapted for clinging on, leaping from, and swinging on tree trunks and branches; the ability to grasp and manipulate small objects (using fingers with nails instead of claws); large brains in relation to body size; and complex social lives.
The scientific classification of primates reflects evolutionary relationships between individual species and groups of species. Strepsirhini (meaning ‘turned-nosed') primate's,-of which the living representatives include lemurs, lorises, and other groups of species all commonly known as prosimians evolved earliest and are the most primitive forms of primates. The earliest monkeys and apes evolved from ancestral haplorhine (meaning ‘simple-nosed') primates, of which the most primitive living representative is the tarsier. Humans evolved from ape ancestors.
Tarsiers have traditionally been grouped with prosimians, but many scientists now recognize that tarsiers, monkeys, and apes share some distinct traits, and group the three together. Monkeys, apes, and humans-who share many traits not found in other primates-together make up the suborder Anthropoidea. Apes and humans together make up the super-family as contributive members of Hominoidea, a grouping that emphasizes the close relationship among the species of these two groups.
Strepsirhines are the most primitive types of living primates. The last common ancestors of Strepsirhines and other mammals creatures similar to tree shrews and classified as Plesiadapiformes,-evolved at least sixty-five million years ago. The earliest primates evolved about fifty-five million years ago, and fossil species similar to lemurs evolved during the Eocene Epoch (about fifty-five million to thirty-eight million years ago). Strepsirhines share all of the basic characteristics of primates, although their brains are not particularly large or complex and they have a more elaborate and sensitive olfactory system (sense of smell) than do other primates.
Tarsiers are the only living representatives of a primitive group of primates that ultimately led to monkeys, apes, and humans. Fossil species called Omomyid, with some traits similar to those of tarsiers, evolved near the beginning of the Eocene, followed by early tarsier-like primates. While the Omomyid and tarsiers are separate evolutionary branches (and there is no living Omomyid), they share features concerning a reduction in the olfactory system, a trait shared by all haplorhine primates, including humans.
The anthropoid primates are divided into New World (South America, Central America, and the Caribbean Islands) and Old World (Africa and Asia) groups. New World monkeys,- such as marmosets, capuchins, and spider monkeys,-belong to the infra-order of platyrrhine (broad-nosed) anthropoids. Old World monkeys and apes belong to the infra-order of catarrhine (downward-nosed) anthropoids. Since humans and apes together make up the hominoids, humans are also catarrhine anthropoids.
The first catarrhine primates evolved between fifty million and thirty-three million years ago. Most primate fossils from this period have been found in a region of northern Egypt known as Al Fayy? Um (or the Fayum). A primate group known as Propliopithecus, one lineage of which is sometimes called Aegyptopithecus, had primitive catarrhine features-that is, it had many basic features that Old World monkeys, apes, and humans share today. Scientists believe, therefore, that Propliopithecus resembles the common ancestor of all later Old World monkeys and apes. Thus, Propliopithecus may also be considered an ancestor or a close relative of an ancestor of humans evolved during the Miocene Epoch (twenty-four million to five million years in the past). Among the oldest known hominoids is a group of primates known by its genus name, Proconsul. Species of Proconsul had features that suggest a close link to the common ancestor of apes and humans,-for example, the lack of a tail. The species Proconsul heseloni lived in the trees of dense forests in eastern Africa about twenty million years ago. An agile climber, it had the flexible backbone and narrow chest characteristic of monkeys, but also a wide range of movement in the hip and thumb, traits characteristic of apes and humans.
Large ape species had originated in Africa by twenty-three million or twenty-two million years ago. By fifteen million years ago, some of these species had migrated to Asia and Europe over a land bridge formed between Africa-Arabian and Eurasian continents, which had previously been separated.
Early in their evolution, the large apes underwent several radiations-periods when new and diverse species branched off from common ancestors. Following Proconsul, the ape genus Afropithecus evolved about eighteen million years ago in Arabia and Africa and diversified into several species. Soon afterward, three other ape genera evolved,-Griphopithecus of western Asia about 16.5 million years ago, the earliest ape to have spread from Africa, as did the genus Kenyapithecus of Africa about fifteen million years ago, moreover the Dryopithecus of Europe about twelve million years ago. Scientists have not yet determined which of these groups of apes may have caused the common ancestor of modern African apes and humans.
Scientists do not all agree about the appropriate classification of hominoids. They group the living hominoids into either two or three families: Hylobatidae, Hominidae, and sometimes Pongidae. Hylobatidae consists of the small or so-called lesser apes of Southeast Asia, commonly known as gibbons and siamangs. The Hominidae (hominids) includes humans and, according to some scientists, the great apes. For those who include mere humans associated with the Hominidae, all of the great apes, including the orangutans of Southeast Asia, belong to the family Pongidae.
In the past only humans were considered to belong to the family Hominidae, and the term hominid referred only to species of humans. Today, however, genetic studies support placing all of the great apes and humans together in this family and the placing of African apes-chimpanzees and gorillas-together with humans at an even lower level, or subfamily
According to this reasoning, the evolutionary branch of Asian apes leading to orangutans, which separated from the other hominid branches nearly thirteen million years ago, belongs to the subfamily Ponginae. The ancestral and living representatives of the African ape and human branches together belong to the subfamily Homininae (sometimes called Hominines). Lastly, the line of early and modern humans belongs to the tribe (classificatory level above genus) Hominini, or hominins.
This order of classification corresponds with the genetic relationships between ape and human species. It groups humans and the African apes together at the same level in which scientists group together, for example, all types of foxes, all buffalo, or all flying squirrels. Within each of these groups, the species are very closely related. However, in the classification of apes and humans the similarities among those mention's of hominoid, hominid, hominine, and hominin may admit to contradiction. In this context, the term early human refers to all species of the human family tree since the divergence from a common ancestor with the African apes. Popular writing often still uses the term hominid to mean the same thing.
About 98.5 percent of the genes in people and chimpanzees are identical, making chimps the closest living biological relatives of humans. This does not mean that humans evolved from chimpanzees, but it does indicate that both species evolved from a common ape ancestor. Orangutans, the great apes of Southeast Asia, differ much more from humans genetically, indicating a more distant evolutionary relationship.
Modern humans have several physical characteristics reflective of an ape ancestry. For instance, people have shoulders with a wide range of movement and fingers capable of strong grasping. In apes, these characteristics are highly developed as adaptations for brachiation, -swinging from branch to branch in trees. Although humans do not brachiate, the general anatomy from that earlier adaptation remains. Both people and apes also have larger brains and greater cognitive abilities than do most other mammals.
Human social life, too, shares similarities with that of African apes and other primates,-such as baboons and rhesus monkeys-that live in large and complex social groups. Group behaviour among chimpanzees, in particular, strongly resembles that of humans. For instance, chimps form long-lasting attachments with each other, participate in social bonding activities, such as grooming, feeding, and hunting; and form strategic coalitions with each other in order to increase their status and power. Early humans also probably had this kind of elaborate social life.
In whatever manner, modern humans fundamentally differ from apes in many significant ways. For example, as intelligent as apes are, people's brains are much larger and more complex, and people have a unique intellectual capacity and elaborate forms of culture and communication. In addition, only people habitually walk upright, can precisely manipulate very small objects, and have a throat structure that makes speech possible.
By around six million years ago in Africa, an apelike species had evolved with two important traits that distinguished it from apes: (1) small canine, or eye, teeth (teeth next to the four incisors, or front teeth) and (2) Bipedalism,-that is, walking on two legs as the primary form of locomotion. Scientists refer to these earliest human species as australopithecines, or Australopiths for short. The earliest Australopiths species known today belong to three genera: Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, and Ardipithecus. Other species belong to the genus Australopithecus and, by some classifications, Paranthropus. The name australopithecine translates literally as ‘southern ape', concerning South Africa, where the first known Australopiths fossils were found.
The Great Rift Valley, a region in eastern Africa in which past movements in Earth's crust have exposed ancient deposits of fossils, has become famous for its Australopiths finds. Countries in which scientists have found Australopiths fossils include Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa, and Chad. Thus, Australopiths ranged widely over the African continent.
Fossils from several different early Australopiths species that lived between four million and two million years ago clearly show a variety of adaptations that marks the transition from ape too human. The very early period of this transition, before four million years ago, remains poorly documented in the fossil record, but those fossils that do exist show the most primitive combinations of ape and human features.
Fossils reveal much about the physical build and activities of early Australopiths, but not everything about outward physical features such as the colour and texture of skin and hair, or about certain behaviours, such as methods of obtaining food or patterns of social interaction. For these reasons, scientists study the living great apes-particularly the African apes to understand better how early Australopiths might have looked and behaved, and how the transition from ape too human might have occurred. For example, Australopiths probably resembled the great apes in characteristics such as the shape of the face and the hair on the body. Australopiths also had brains roughly equal in size to those of the great apes, so they probably had apelike mental abilities. Their social life probably resembled that of chimpanzees.
Most of the distinctly human physical qualities in Australopiths related to their bipedal stance. Before Australopiths, no mammal had ever evolved an anatomy for habitual upright walking. Australopiths also had small canine teeth, as compared with long canines found in most other catarrhine primates.
Other characteristics of Australopiths reflected their ape ancestry. They had a low cranium behind a projecting face, and a brain size of 390 to 550 cu. cm. (24 to thirty-four cu. in.) - between an ape's brain. The body weight of Australopiths, as estimated from their bones, ranged from twenty-seven to 49 kg. (sixty to 108 lb.), and they stood 1.1 to 1.5 m. (3.5 to 5 ft.) tall. Their weight and height compare closely to those of chimpanzees (chimp height measured standing). Some Australopiths species had a large degree of sexual dimorphism-males were much larger than females-a trait also found in gorillas, orangutans, and other primates.
Australopiths also had curved fingers and long thumbs with a wide range of movement. In comparison, the fingers of apes are longer, more powerful, and more curved, making them extremely well adapted for hanging and swinging from branches. Apes also have very short thumbs, which limits their ability to manipulate small objects. Paleoanthropologists speculate about whether the long and dexterous thumbs of Australopiths allowed them to use tools more efficiently than do apes.
The anatomy of Australopiths shows several adaptations for Bipedalism, in both the upper and lower body. Adaptations in the lower body included the following: The australopithilium, or pelvic bone, which rises above the hip joint, was much shorter and broader than it is in apes. This shape enabled the hip muscles to steady the body during each step. The Australopiths pelvis also had a bowl-like shape, which supported the internal organs in an upright stance. The upper legs angled inward from the hip joints, which positioned the knees better to support the body during upright walking. The legs of apes, on the other hand, are positioned almost straight down from the hip, so that when an ape walks upright for a short distance, its body sways from side to side. Australopiths also had short and fewer flexible toes than do apes. The toes worked as rigid levers for pushing off the ground during each bipedal step.
Other adaptations occurred above the pelvis. The Australopiths spine had a S-shaped curve, which shortened the overall length of the torso and gave it rigidity and balance when standing. By contrast, apes have a straight spine. The Australopiths skull also had an important adaptation related to Bipedalism. The opening at the bottom of the skull through which the spinal cord attaches to the brain, called the foramen magnum, was positioned more forward than it is in apes. This position set the head in balance over the upright spine.
Australopiths clearly walked upright on the ground, but paleoanthropologists debate whether the earliest humans also spent a significant amount of time in the trees. Certain physical features indicate that they spent at least some of their time climbing in trees. Such features included they're curved and elongated fingers and elongated arms. However, their fingers, unlike those of apes, may not have been long enough to allow them to brachiate through the treetops. Study of fossil wrist bones suggests that early Australopiths could lock their wrists, preventing backward bending at the wrist when the body weight was placed on the knuckles of the hand. This could mean that the earliest bipeds had an ancestor that walked on its knuckles, as African apes do.
Compared with apes, humans have very small canine teeth. Apes-particularly males-have thick, projecting, sharp canines that they use for displays of aggression and as weapons to defend themselves. The oldest known bipeds, who lived at least six million years ago, still had large canines by human standards, though not as large as in apes. By four million years ago Australopiths had developed the human characteristic of having smaller, flatter canines. Canine reduction might have related to an increase in social cooperation between humans and an accompanying decrease in the need for males to make aggressive displays.
The Australopiths can be divided into an early group of species, known as gracile Australopiths, which arose before three million years ago, and a later group, known as robust Australopiths, which evolved after three million years ago. The gracile Australopiths,-of which several species evolved between 4.5 million and three million years in the past,-generally had smaller teeth and jaws. The later-evolving robust had larger faces with large jaws and molars (cheek teeth). These traits indicate powerful and prolonged chewing of food, and analyses of wear on the chewing surface of robust Australopiths molar teeth's support this idea. Some fossils of early Australopiths have features resembling those of the later species, suggesting that the robustus evolved from one or more gracile ancestors.
Paleoanthropologists recognize at least eight species of early Australopiths. These include the three earliest established species, which belong to the genuses' Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, and Ardipithecus, a species of the genus Kenyanthropus, and four species of the genus Australopithecus.
The oldest known Australopiths species is Sahelanthropus tchadensis. Fossils of this species were first discovered in 2001 in northern Chad, Central Africa, by a research team led by French paleontologist Michel Brunet. The researchers estimated the fossils to be between seven million and six million years old. One of the fossils has a fracture but nearly completes the cranium that shows a combination of apelike and humanlike features. Apelike features include small brain size, an elongated brain case, and areas of bone where strong neck muscles would have attached. Humanlike features are to include small, flat canine teeth, a short middle part of the face, and a massive brow ridge (a bony, protruding ridge above the eyes) similar to that of later human fossils. The opening where the spinal cord attaches to the brain is tucked under the brain case, which suggests that the head was balanced on an upright body. It is not certain that Sahelanthropus walked bipedally, however, because bones from the rest of its skeleton have yet to be discovered. Nonetheless, its age and humanlike characteristics suggest that the human and African ape lineages had divided from one another by at least six million years ago.
In addition to reigniting debate about human origins, the discovery of Sahelanthropus in Chad significantly expanded the known geographic range of the earliest humans. The Great Rift Valley and South Africa, from which most other discoveries of early human fossils came, are apparently not the only regions of the continent that preserve the oldest clues of human evolution.
Orrorin tugenensis lived about six million years ago. This species was discovered in 2000 by a research team led by French paleontologist Brigitte Sent and French geologist Martin Pickford in the Tugen Hills region of central Kenya. The researchers found more than a dozen early human fossils dating between 6.2 million and six million years old. Among the finds were two thighbones that possess a groove indicative of an upright stance and bipedal walking. Although the finds are still being studied, the researchers consider these thighbones to be the oldest evidence of habitual two-legged walking. Fossilized bones from other parts of the skeleton show apelike features, including long, curved finger bones useful for strong grasping and movement through trees, and apelike canine and premolar teeth. Because of this distinctive combination of ape and human traits, the researchers gave a new genus and species name to these fossils, Orrorin tugenensis, which in the local language means ‘original man in the Tugen region. The age of these fossils suggests that the divergence of humans from our common ancestor with chimpanzees occurred before six million years ago.
In 1994 an Ethiopian member of a research team led by American paleoanthropologists Tim White discovered human fossils estimated to be about 4.4 million year's old. White and his colleagues gave their discovery the name Ardipithecus ramidus. Ramid means ‘root' in the Afar language of Ethiopia and refers to the closeness of this new species to the roots of humanity. At the time of discovery, the genus Australopithecus was scientifically well established. White devised the genus name Ardipithecus to distinguish this new species from other Australopiths because its fossils had a very ancient combination of apelike and humanlike traits. More recent finds indicate that this species may have lived as early as 5.8 million to 5.2 million years ago.
The teeth of Ardipithecus ramidus had a thin outer layer of enamel,-a trait also seen in the African apes but not in other Australopiths species or older fossil apes. This trait suggests a close relationship with an ancestor of the African apes. In addition, the skeleton shows strong similarities to that of a chimpanzee but has slightly reduced canine teeth and adaptations for Bipedalism.
In 1965 a research team from Harvard University discovered a single arm bone of an early human at the site of Kanapoi in northern Kenya. The researchers estimated this bone to be four million years old, but could not identify the species to which it belonged or return at the time to look for related fossils. It was not until 1994 that a research team, led by British-born Kenyan paleoanthropologists Meave Leakey, found numerous teeth and fragments of bone at the site that could be linked to the previously discovered fossil. Leakey and her colleagues determined that the fossils were those of the very primitive species of Australopiths, which was given the name Australopithecus Anamensis. Researchers have since found other A. Anamensis fossils at nearby sites, dating between about 4.2 million and 3.9 million years old. The skull of this species appears apelike, while its enlarged tibia (lower leg bone) indicates that it supported its full body weight on one leg at a time, as in regular bipedal walking
Australopithecus Anamensis was quite similar to another, much better-known species, A. afarensis, a gracile Australopiths that thrived in eastern Africa between about 3.9 million and three million years ago. The most celebrated fossil of this species, known as Lucy, is a partial skeleton of a female discovered by American paleoanthropologists Donald Johanson in 1974 at Hadar, Ethiopia. Lucy lived 3.2 million years ago. Scientists have identified several hundred fossils of A. afarensis from Hadar, including a collection representing at least thirteen individuals of both sexes and various ages, all from a single site.
Researchers working in northern Tanzania have also found fossilized bones of A. afarensis at Laetoli. This site, dated at 3.6 million years old, is best known for its spectacular trails of bipedal human footprints. Preserved in hardened volcanic ash, these footprints were discovered in 1978 by a research team led by British paleoanthropologists Mary Leakey. They provide irrefutable evidence that Australopiths regularly walked bipedally.
Paleoanthropologists have debated interpretations of the characteristics of A. afarensis and its place in the human family tree. One controversy centres on the Laetoli footprints, which some scientists believe show that the foot anatomy and gait of A. afarensis did not exactly match those of the modern humans. This observation may indicate that early Australopiths did not live primarily on the ground or at least spent a significant amount of time in the trees. The skeleton of Lucy also indicates that A. afarensis had longer, more powerful arms than most later human species, suggesting that this species was adept at climbing trees. Another controversy relates to the scientific classification of the A. afarensis fossils, compared with Lucy, who stood only 1.1 m. (3.5 ft.) tall, other fossils identified as A. afarensis from Hadar and Laetoli came from individuals who stood up to 1.5 m. (5 ft.) tall. This great difference in size leads some scientists to suggest that the entire set of fossils now classified as A. afarensis represents two species. Most scientists, however, believe the fossils represent one highly dimorphic species,-that is, a species that has two distinct forms (in this case, two sizes). Supporters of this view may note that the two large (presumably male) and small (presumably female) adults occur together in one site at Hadar.
A third controversy arises from the claim that A. afarensis was the common ancestor of both later Australopiths and the modern human genus, Homo. While this idea remains a strong possibility, the similarity between this and another Australopiths species-one from southern Africa, named Australopithecus africanus-makes it difficult to decide which of the two species led to the genus Homo.
Australopithecus africanus thrived in the Transvaal region of what is now South Africa between about 3.3 million and 2.5 million years ago. Australian-born anatomist Raymond Dart discovered this species-the first known Australopiths-in 1924 at Taung, South Africa. The specimen that of a young child, became known as the Taung Child. For decades after this discovery, almost no one in the scientific community believed Dart's claim that the skull came from an ancestral human. In the late 1930's teams led by Scottish-born South African paleontologist Robert Broom unearthed many more A. africanus skulls and other bones from the Transvaal site of Sterkfontein.
A. africanus generally had a more globular braincase and less primitive-looking face and teeth than did A. afarensis. Thus, some scientists consider the southern species of early Australopiths to be a likely ancestor of the genus Homo. According to other scientists, however, certain heavily built facial and cranial features of A. africanus from Sterkfontein identify it as an ancestor of the robust Australopiths that lived later in the same region. In 1998 a research team led by South African paleoanthropologists Ronald Clarke discovered an almost complete early Australopiths skeleton at Sterkfontein. This important find may resolve some of the questions about where A. africanus fits in the story of human evolution.
Working in the Lake Turkana's region of northern Kenya, a research team led by paleontologist in which Meave Leakey uncovered 1999 a cranium and other bone remains of an early human that showed a mixture of features unseen in previous discoveries of early human fossils. The remains were estimated to be 3.5 million years old, and the cranium's small brain and earhole was similar to those of the earliest humans. Its cheekbone, however, joined the rest of the face in a forward position, and the region beneath the nose opening was flat. These are traits found in later human fossils from around two million years ago, typically those classified in the genus Homo. Noting this unusual combination of traits, researchers named a new genus and species, Kenyanthropus platy ops, or ‘flat-faced human from Kenya.' Before this discovery, it seemed that only a single early human species, Australopithecus afarensis, lived in East Africa between four million and three million years ago. Yet Kenyanthropus indicates that a diversity of species, including a more humanlike lineage than A. afarensis, lived in this period, just as in most other eras in human prehistory.
The human fossil record is poorly known between three million and two million years ago, from which carries over recent finds from the site of Bouri, Ethiopia, particularly important. From 1996 to 1998, a research team led by Ethiopian paleontologist Berhane Asfaw and American paleontologist Tim White found the skull and other skeletal remains of an early human specimen about 2.5 million years old. The researchers named it Australopithecus garhi; the word garhi means ‘surprise' in the Afar language. The specimen is unique in having large incisors and molars in combination with an elongated forearm and thighbone. Its powerful arm bones suggest a tree-living ancestry, but its longer legs indicate the ability to walk upright on the ground. Fossils of A. garhi are associated with some of the oldest known stone tools, along with animal bones that were cut and cracked with tools. It is possible, then, that this species was among the first to make the transition to stone Toolmaking and to eating meat and bone marrow from large animals.
By 2.7 million years ago the later, robust Australopiths had evolved. These species had what scientists refer to as megadont cheek teeth-wide molars and premolars coated with thick enamel. Their incisors, by contrast, were small. The robusts also had an expanded, flattened, and more vertical face than did gracile Australopiths. This face shape helped to absorb the stresses of strong chewing. On the top of the head, robust Australopiths had a sagittal crest (ridge of bone along the top of the skull from front to back) to which thick jaw muscles attached. The zygomatic arches (which extend back from the cheek bones to the ears), curved out wide from the side of the face and cranium, forming very large openings for the massive chewing muscles to pass through near their attachment to the lower jaw. Together, these traits indicate that the robust Australopiths chewed their food powerfully and for long periods.
Other ancient animal species that specialized in eating plants, such as some types of wild pigs, had similar adaptations in their facial, dental, and cranial anatomy. Thus, scientists think that the robust Australopiths had a diet consisting partly of tough, fibrous plant foods, such as seed pods and underground tubers. Analyses of microscopic wear on the teeth of some robust Australopiths specimens appear to support the idea of a vegetarian diet, although chemical studies of fossils suggest that the southern robust species may also have eaten meat.
Scientists originally used the word robust to refer to the late Australopiths out of the belief that they had much larger bodies than did the early, gracile Australopiths. However, further research has revealed that the robust Australopiths stood about the same height and weighed roughly the same amount as Australopithecus afarensis and A. africanus.
The earliest known robust species, Australopithecus aethiopicus, lived in eastern Africa by 2.7 million years ago. In 1985 at West Turkana, Kenya, American paleoanthropologists Alan Walker discovered a 2.5-million-year-old fossil skull that helped to define this species. It became known as the ‘black skull' because of the colour it had absorbed from minerals in the ground. The skull had a tall sagittal crest toward the back of its cranium and a face that projected far outward from the forehead. A. aethiopicus shared some primitive features with
A. afarensis,-that is, features that originated in the earlier East African Australopiths. This may indicate that A. aethiopicus evolved from A. afarensis.
Australopithecus boisei, the other well-known East African robust Australopiths, lived over a long period, between about 2.3 million and 1.2 million years ago. In 1959 Mary Leakey discovered the original fossil of this species-a nearly complete skull-at the site of Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania. Kenyan-born paleoanthropologists Louis Leakey, husband of Mary, originally named the new species Zinjanthropus boisei (Zinjanthropus translates as ‘East African man'). This skull-dating from 1.8 million years ago-has the most specialized features of all the robust species. It could withstand extreme chewing forces, and molars four times the size of those in modern humans. Since the discovery of Zinjanthropus, now recognized as an Australopiths, scientists have found many A. boisei fossils in Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia.
The southern robust species, called Australopithecus robustus, lived between about 1.8 million and 1.3 million years ago in Transvaal, the same region that was home to A. africanus. In 1938 Robert Broom, who had found many A. africanus fossils, bought a fossil jaw and molar that looked distinctly different from those in A. africanus. After finding the site of Kromdraai, from which the fossil had come, Broom collected many more bones and teeth that together convinced him to name a new species, which he called Paranthropus robustus (Paranthropus meaning ‘beside man'). Later scientists dated this skull at about 1.5 million years old. In the late 1940's and 1950 Broom discovered many more fossils of this species at the Transvaal site of Swartkrans.
Many scientists believe that robust Australopiths represent a distinct evolutionary group of early humans because these species share features associated with heavy chewing. According to this view, Australopithecus aethiopicus diverged from other Australopiths and later produced A. boisei and A. robustus. Paleoanthropologists who strongly support this view think that the robusts should be classified in the genus Paranthropus, the original name given to the southern species. Thus, these three species are sometimes called, P. aethiopicus, P. boisei, and P. robustus.
Other paleoanthropologists believe that the eastern robust species, A. aethiopicus and A. boisei, may have evolved from an early Australopiths of the same region, perhaps A. afarensis. According to this view, A. africanus gave rise only to the southern species, A. robustus. Scientists refer to such a case -in that two or more independent species evolve similar characteristics in different places or at different times,-as parallel evolution. If parallel evolution occurred in Australopiths, the robust species would make up two separate branches of the human family tree.
The last robust Australopiths died out about 1.2 million years ago. At about this time, climate patterns around the world entered a period of fluctuation, and these changes may have reduced the food supply on which robusts depended. Interaction with larger-brained members of the genus Homo, such as Homo erectus, may also have contributed to the decline of late Australopiths, although no compelling evidence exists of such direct contact. Competition with several other species of plant-eating monkeys and pigs, which thrived in Africa at the time, may have been an even more important factor. Nevertheless, the reasons why the robust Australopiths became extinct after flourishing for such a long time are not yet known for sure.
Scientists have several ideas about why Australopiths first split from the apes, initiating the course of human evolution. Nearly all hypotheses suggest that environmental change was an important factor, specifically in influencing the evolution of Bipedalism. Some well-established ideas about why humans first evolved include (1) the savanna hypothesis, (2) the woodland-mosaic hypothesis, and (3) the variability hypothesis.
The global climate cooled and became drier between eight million and five million years ago, near the end of the Miocene Epoch. According to the savanna hypothesis, this climate change broke up and reduced the area of African forests. As the forests shrunk, an ape population in eastern Africa became separated from other populations of apes in the more heavily forested areas of western Africa. The eastern population had to adapt to its drier environment, which contained larger areas of grassy savanna.
The expansion of dry terrain favoured the evolution of terrestrial living, and made it more difficult to survive by living in trees. Terrestrial apes might have formed large social groups in order to improve their ability to find and collect food and to fend off predators-activities that also may have required the ability to communicate well. The challenges of savanna life might also have promoted the rise of tool use, for purposes such as scavenging meat from the kills of predators. These important evolutionary changes would have depended on increased mental abilities and, therefore, may have correlated with the development of larger brains in early humans.
Critics of the savanna hypothesis argue against it on several grounds, but particularly for two reasons. First, discoveries by a French scientific team of Australopiths fossils in Chad, in Central Africa, suggest that the environments of East Africa may not have been fully separated from those farther west. Second, recent research suggests that open savannas were not prominent in Africa until sometime after two million years ago
Criticism of the savanna hypothesis has spawned alternative ideas about early human evolution. The woodland-mosaic hypothesis proposes that the early Australopiths evolved in patchily wooded areas-a mosaic of woodland and grassland-that offered opportunities for feeding both on the ground and in the trees, and that ground feeding favoured Bipedalism.
The variability hypothesis suggests that early Australopiths experienced many changes in environment and ended up living in a range of habitats, including forests, open-canopy woodlands, and savannas. In response, their populations became adapted to a variety of surroundings. Scientists have found that this range of habitats existed at the time when the early Australopiths evolved. So the development of new anatomical characteristics,-particularly Bipedalism-combined with an ability to climb trees, may have given early humans the versatility to live in a variety of habitats.
Scientists also have many ideas about which benefits of Bipedalism may have influenced its evolution. Ideas about the benefits of regular Bipedalism include that it freed the hands, making it easier to carry food and tools; allowed early humans to see over tall grass to watch for predators; reduced vulnerability of the body and too hot of the sun, provided an increased exposure to cooling winds; improved the ability to hunt or use weapons, which became easier with an upright posture; and made extensive feeding from bushes and low branches easier than it would have been for a quadruped. Scientists do not overwhelmingly support any one of these ideas. Recent studies of chimpanzees suggest, though, that the ability to feed more easily might have particular relevance. Chimps carry through an action on two legs most often when they feed from the ground on the leaves and fruits of bushes and low branches. Chimps cannot, however, walk in this way over long distances.
Bipedalism in early humans would have enabled them to travel efficiently over long distances, giving them an advantage over quadrupedal apes in moving across barren open terrain between groves of trees. In addition, the earliest humans continued to have the advantage from their ape ancestry of being able to escape into the trees to avoid predators. The benefits of both Bipedalism and agility in the trees may explain the unique anatomy of Australopiths. Their long, powerful arms and curved fingers probably made them good climbers, while their pelvis and lower limb structure were reshaped for upright walking people belong to the genus Homo, which first evolved at least 2.3 million to 2.5 million years ago. The earliest members of this genus differed from the Australopiths in at least one important respect-they had larger brains than did their predecessors.
The evolution of the modern human genus can be divided roughly into three periods: during an early stage, an intermediate period and late. Species of early Homo resembled gracile Australopiths in many ways. Some early Homo species lived until possibly 1.6 million years ago. The period of the middle Homo began perhaps between two million and 1.8 million years ago, overlapping with the end of early Homo. Species of Middle Homo evolved an anatomy much more similar to that of modern humans but had comparatively small brains. The transition from Intermittent to late Homo probably occurred sometime around 200,000 years ago. Species of late Homo evolved large and complex brains and eventually language. Culture also became an increasingly important part of human life during the most recent period of evolution.
The origin of the genus Homo has long intrigued paleoanthropologists and prompted much debate. One of several known species of Australopiths, or one not yet discovered, could have caused the first species of Homo. Scientists also do not know exactly what factors favoured the evolution of a larger and more complex brain-the defining physical trait of modern humans.
Louis Leakey originally argued that the origin of Homo related directly to the development of Toolmaking,-specifically, the making of stone tools. Toolmaking requires certain mental skills and fine hand manipulation that may exist only in members of our own genus. The name Homo habilis (meaning ‘repairer') refer directly to the making and use of tools
However, several species of Australopiths lived just when early Homo, making it unclear which species produced the earliest stone tools. Recent studies of Australopiths hand bones have suggested that at least a robust species, Australopithecus robustus, could have made tools. In addition, during the 1960's and 1970's researchers first observed that some nonhuman primates, such as chimpanzees, make and use tools, suggesting that Australopiths and the apes that preceded them probably also made some kinds of tools.
Scientists began to notice a high degree of variability in body size as they discovered more early Homo fossils. This could have indicated that H. habilis had a large amount of sexual dimorphism. For instance, the Olduvai female skeleton was dwarfed in comparison with other fossils,-exemplified by a sizable early Homo cranium from East Turkana in northern Kenya. However, the differences in size exceeded those expected between males and females of the same species, and this finding later helped convince scientists that another species of early Homo had lived in eastern Africa.
This second species of early Homo was given the name Homo rudolfensis, after Lake Rudolf (now Lake Turkana). The best-known fossils of H. rudolfensis come from the area surrounding this lake and date from about 1.9 million years ago. Paleoanthropologists have not determined the entire time range during which H. rudolfensis may have lived.
This species had a larger face and body than did H. habilis. The cranial capacity of H. rudolfensis averaged about 750 cu cm (46 cu. in.). Scientists need more evidence to know whether the brain of H. rudolfensis in relation to its body size was larger than that proportion in H. habilis. A larger brain-to-body-size, and ratio can indicate increased mental abilities. H. rudolfensis also had large teeth, approaching the size of those in robust Australopiths. The discovery of even a partial fossil skeleton would reveal whether this larger form of early Homo had apelike or more modern body proportions. Scientists have found several modern-looking thighbones that date from between two million and 1.8 million years ago and may belong to H. rudolfensis. These bones suggest a body size of 1.5 m. (5 ft.) and 52 kg. (114 lb.).
By about 1.9 million years ago, the period of middle Homo had begun in Africa. Until recently, paleoanthropologists recognized one species in this period, Homo erectus. Many now recognize three species of middle Homo: Homo. ergaster, Homo. erectus, and Homo. heidelbergensis. However, some still think Homo ergaster is an early African form of H. erectus, or that Homo heidelbergensis is a late form of the Homo erectus.
The skulls and teeth of early African populations of Middle Homo differed subtly from those of later H. erectus populations from China and the island of Java in Indonesia. H. ergaster makes a better candidate for an ancestor of the modern human line because Asian H. erectus has some specialized features not seen in some later humans, including our own species. H. heidelbergensis has similarities to both
H. erectus and the later species. The H. neanderthalensis, even if it may have been a transitional species between middle Homo and the line to which modern humans belong.
Homo ergaster probably first evolved in Africa around two million years ago. This species had a rounded cranium with a brain size of between 700 and 850 cu. cm. (49 to fifty-two cu. in), a prominent brow ridge, small teeth, and many other features that it shared with the later H. erectus. Many paleoanthropologists consider H. ergaster a good candidate for an ancestor of modern humans because it had several modern skull features, including thin cranial bones. Most H. ergaster fossils come from the time range of 1.8 million to 1.5 million years ago.
The most important fossil of this species yet found is a nearly complete skeleton of a young male from West Turkana, Kenya, which dates from about 1.55 million years ago. Scientists determined the sex of the skeleton from the shape of its pelvis. They also determined from patterns of tooth eruption and bone growth that the boy had died when he was between nine and twelve years old. The oldest humanlike fossils outside Africa have also been classified as H. ergaster, dated around 1.75 million year's old. These finds, from the Dmanisi site in the southern Caucasus Mountains of Georgia, consist of several crania, jaws, and other fossilized bones. Some of these are strikingly like East African H. ergaster, but others are smaller or larger than H. ergaster, suggesting a high degree of variation within a single population
H. ergaster, H. rudolfensis, and H. habilis, in addition to possibly two robust Australopiths, all might have coexisted in Africa around 1.9 million years ago. This finding goes against a traditional paleoanthropological view that human evolution consisted of a single line that evolved progressively over time-an Australopiths species followed by early Homo, then Middle Homo, and finally H. sapiens. It appears that periods of species diversity and extinction have been common during human evolution, and that modern H. sapiens has the rare distinction of being the only living human species today.
Although H. ergaster appears to have coexisted with several other human species, they probably did not interbreed. Mating rarely succeeds between two species with significant skeletal differences, such as H. ergaster and H. habilis. Many paleoanthropologists now believe that H. ergaster descended from an earlier population of Homo-perhaps one of the two known species of early Homo-and that the modern human line descended from the H. ergaster.
Paleoanthropologists now know that humans first evolved in Africa and lived only on that continent for a few million years. The earliest human species known to have spread in large numbers beyond the African continent was first discovered in Southeast Asia. In 1891 Dutch physician Eugene Dubois found the cranium of an early human on the Indonesian island of Java. He named this early human Pithecanthropus erectus, or ‘erect ape-man.' Today paleoanthropologists call this species Homo erectus.
H. erectus appears to have evolved in Africa from earlier populations of H. ergaster, and then spread to Asia sometime between 1.8 million and 1.5 million years ago. The youngest known fossils of this species, from the Solo River in Java, may date from about 50,000 years ago (although that dating is controversial). So, H. erectus was a very successful species,-both widespread, having lived in Africa and much of Asia, and long-lived, having survived for possibly more than 1.5 million years.
H. erectus had a low and rounded braincase that was elongated form front to back, a prominent brow ridge, and adult cranial capacity of 800 to 1,250 cu. cm. (50 to eighty cu. in.), an average twice that of the Australopiths. Its bones, including the cranium, were thicker than those of earlier species. Prominent muscle markings and thick, reinforced areas on the bones of H. erectus indicate that its body could withstand powerful movements and stresses. Although it had much smaller teeth than did the Australopiths, it had a heavy and strong jaw.
In the 1920's and 1930's German anatomist and physical anthropologist Franz Weidenreich excavated the most famous collections of H. erectus fossils from a cave at the site of Zhoukoudian (Chou-k ou-tien), China, near Beijing (Peking). Scientists dubbed these fossil humans Sinanthropus pekinensis, or Peking Man, but others later reclassified them as H. erectus. The Zhoukoudian cave yielded the fragmentary remains of more than 30 individuals, ranging from about 500,000 to 250,000 years old. These fossils were lost near the outbreak of World War II, but Weidenreich had made excellent casts of his finds. Further studies at the cave site have yielded more H. erectus remains.
Other important fossil sites for this species in China include Lantian, Yuanmou, Yunxian, and Hexian. Researchers have also recovered many tools made by H. erectus in China at sites such as Nihewan and Bose, and other sites of similar age (at least one million to 250,000 years old).
Ever since the discovery of H. erectus, scientists have debated whether this species was a direct ancestor of later humans, including H. sapiens. The last populations of H. erectus-such as those from the Solo River in Java-may have lived as recently as 50,000 years ago, while did populations of H. sapiens. Modern humans could not have evolved from these late populations of the H. erectus, a much more primitive type of human. However, earlier East Asian populations could have produced The
Homo sapiens.
Many paleoanthropologists believe that early humans migrated into Europe by 800,000 years ago, and that these populations were not Homo erectus. Most scientists refer to these early migrants into Europe,-who predated both Neanderthals and H. sapiens in the region, as
H. heidelbergensis. The species name comes from a 500,000-year-old jaw found near Heidelberg, Germany
Scientists have found few human fossils in Africa for the period between 1.2 million and 600,000 years ago, during which H. heidelbergensis or its ancestors first migrated into Europe. Populations of H. ergaster (or possibly H. erectus) appear to have lived until at least 800,000 years ago in Africa, and possibly until 500,000 years ago in northern Africa. When these populations disappeared, other massive-boned and larger-brained humans-possibly H. heidelbergensis-appear to have replaced them. Scientists have found fossils of these stockier humans at sites in Bodo Ethiopia, Saldanha (also known as Elandsfontein), South Africa, Ndutu, Tanzania, Kabwe, and Zimbabwe.
Scientists have come up with at least three different interpretations of these African fossils. Some scientists place the fossils in the species H. heidelbergensis and think that this species led to both the Neanderthals (in Europe) and H. sapiens (in Africa). Others think that the European and African fossils belong to two distinct species, and that the African populations that, in this view, was not
H. heidelbergensis but a separate species produced Homo sapiens. Yet other scientists advocate a long-head view that H. erectus similarly, Homo sapiens belong to a single evolving lineage, and that the African fossils belong in the category of archaic H. sapiens (archaic meaning not fully anatomically modern).
The fossil evidence does not clearly favour any of these three interpretations over another. Several fossils from Asia, Africa, and Europe have features that are intermediate between early H. ergaster and H. sapiens. This kind of variation makes it hard to decide how to identify distinct species and to determine which group of fossils represents the most likely ancestor of later humans.
Scientists once thought that advances in stone tools could have enabled early humans such as Homo erectus to move into Asia and Europe, perhaps by helping them to obtain new kinds of food, such as the meat of large mammals. If African human populations had developed tools that allowed them to hunt large game effectively, they would have had a good source of food wherever they went. In this view, humans first migrated into Eurasia based on a unique cultural adaptation.
By 1.5 million years ago, early humans had begun to make new kinds of tools, which scientists call Acheulean. Common Acheulean tools included large hand axes and cleavers. While these new tools might have helped early humans to hunt, the first known Acheulean tools in Africa date from later than the earliest known human presence in Asia. Also, most East Asian sites more than 200,000 years old contains only simply shaped cobble and flake tools. In contrast, Acheulean tools were more finely crafted, larger, and more symmetrical. Thus, the earliest settlers of Eurasia did not have a true Acheulean technology, and advances in Toolmaking alone cannot explain the spread out of Africa.
Another possibility is that the early spreads of humans to Eurasia were not unique, but part of a wider migration of meat-eating animals, such as lions and hyenas. The human migration out of Africa occurred during the early part of the Pleistocene Epoch, between 1.8 million and 780,000 years ago. Many African carnivores spread to Eurasia during the early Pleistocene, and humans could have moved along with them. In this view, H. erectus was one of many meat-eating species to expand into Eurasia from Africa, rather than a uniquely adapted species. Relying on meat as a primary food source might have allowed many meat-eating species, including humans, to move through many different environments without having to learn about unfamiliar and potentially poisonous plants quickly.
However, the migration of humans to eastern Asia may have occurred gradually and through lower latitudes and environments similar to those of Africa. If East African populations of H. erectus moved at only 1.6 km. (1 mi.) every twenty years, they could have reached Southeast Asia in 150,000 years. Over this amount of time, humans could have learned about and begun relying on edible plant foods. Thus, eating meat may not have played a crucial role in the first human migrations to new continents. Careful comparison of animal fossils, stone tools, and early human fossils from Africa, Asia, and Europe will help scientists better to determine what factors motivated and allowed humans to venture out of Africa for the first time.
The origin of our own species, Homo sapiens, is one of the most hotly debated topics in Paleoanthropology. This debate centres on whether or not modern humans have a direct relationship to H. erectus or to the Neanderthals, and to a great extent is acknowledged of the more modern group of humans who evolved within the past 250,000 years. Paleoanthropologists commonly use the term anatomically modern Homo sapiens to distinguish people of today from these similar predecessors.
Traditionally, paleoanthropologists classified as Homo sapiens any fossil human younger than 500,000 years old with a braincase larger than that of H. erectus. Thus, many scientists who believe that modern humans descend from a single line dating back to H. erectus use the name archaic Homo sapiens to refer to a variety of fossil humans that predate anatomically modern H. sapiens. The designate with archaic denote a set of physical features typical of Neanderthals and other species of late Homo before modern Homo sapiens. These features include a combination of a robust skeleton, a large but low braincase (positioned in a measure behind, rather than over, the face), and a lower jaw lacking a prominent chin. In this sense, Neanderthals are sometimes classified as a subspecies of archaic H. sapiens and H. Sapiens neanderthalensis. Other scientists think that the variation in archaic fossils falls into clearly identifiable sets of traits, and that any type of human fossil exhibiting a unique set of traits should have a new species name. According to this view, the Neanderthals belong to their own species, H. neanderthalensis.
The Neanderthals lived in areas ranging from western Europe through central Asia from about 200,000 to about 28,000 years ago. The name Neanderthal (sometimes spelled Neanderthal) comes from fossils found in 1856 in the Feldhofer Cave of the Neander Valley in Germany (tal,-a modern form of that-means ‘valley' in German). Scientists realized several years later that prior discoveries, at Engis, Belgium, in 1829 and at Forbes Quarry, Gibraltar, in 1848,-also represented Neanderthal. These two earlier discoveries were the first early human fossils ever found.
In the past. Scientists claimed that Neanderthal differed greatly from modern humans. However, the basis for this claim came from a faulty reconstruction of a Neanderthal skeleton that showed it with bent knees and a slouching gait. This reconstruction gave the common but mistaken impression that Neanderthals were dim-witted brutes who lived a crude lifestyle. On the contrary, Neanderthals, like the species that preceded them, walked fully upright without a slouch or bent knees. In addition, their cranial capacity was quite large at about 1,500 cu. cm. (about ninety cu. in.), larger on average than that of modern humans. (The difference probably relates to the greater muscle mass of Neanderthals as compared with modern humans, which usually correlates with a larger brain size.)
Compared with earlier humans, Neanderthals had a high degree of cultural sophistication. They appear to have acted symbolic rituals, such as the burial of they're dead. Neanderthal fossils,-including some complete skeletons is quite common compared with those of earlier forms of Homo, in part because of the Neanderthal practice of intentional burial. Neanderthals also produced sophisticated types of stone tools known as Mousterian, which involved creating blanks (rough forms) from which several types of tools could be made. Along with many physical similarities, Neanderthals differed from modern humans in several ways. The typical Neanderthal skull had a low forehead, a large nasal area (suggesting a large nose), a forward-projecting nasal and cheek region, a prominent brow ridge with a bony arch over each eye, a non-projecting chin, and obvious space behind the third molar (in front of the upward turn of the lower jaw).
Neanderthals, in addition, had a distinctively heavily built and large-boned skeleton than do modern humans. Other Neanderthal skeletal features included a bowing of the limb bones in some individuals, broad scapulae (shoulder blades), hip joints turned outward, a long and thin pubic bone, short lower leg and arm bones relative to the upper bones, and large surfaces on the joints of the toes and limb bones. Together, these traits made a powerful, compact body of short stature males averaged 1.7 m. (5 ft. 5 in.) tall and 84 kg. (185 lb.), and females averaged 1.5 m. (5 ft.) tall and 80 kg. (176 lb.).
The short, stocky build of Neanderthals conserved heat and helped them withstand extremely cold conditions that prevailed in temperate regions beginning about 70,000 years ago. The last known Neanderthal fossils come from western Europe and date from approximately 36,000 years ago.
Just when Neanderthal populations grew in number in Europe and parts of Asia, other populations of nearly modern humans arose in Africa and Asia. Scientists also commonly refer to these fossils, which are distinct from but similar to those of Neanderthals, as archaic. Fossils from the Chinese sites of Dali, Maba, and Xujiayao display the long, low cranium and large face typical of archaic humans, yet they also have features similar to those of modern people in the region. At the cave site of Jebel Irhoud, Morocco, scientists have found fossils with the long skull typical of archaic humans but also the modern traits of a moderately higher forehead and flatter mid face. Fossils of humans from East African sites older than 100,000 years, such as Ngaloba in Tanzania and Eliye Springs in Kenya-also seem to show a mixture of archaic and modern traits.
The oldest known fossils that possess skeletal features typical of modern humans date from between 130,000 and 90,000 years ago. Several key features distinguish the skulls of modern humans from those of archaic species. These features include a much smaller brow ridge, if any; a globe-shaped braincase; and a flat or only projecting face of reduced size, located under the front of the braincase. Among all mammals, only humans have a face positioned directly beneath the frontal lobe (forward-most area) of the brain. As a result, modern humans tend to have a higher forehead than did Neanderthals and other archaic humans. The cranial capacity of modern humans ranges from about 1,000 to 2,000 cu. cm. (60 to 120 cu. in.), with the average being about 1,350 cu. cm. (80 cu. in.).
Scientists have found both fragmentary and nearly complete cranial fossils of early anatomically modern Homo sapiens from the sites of Singha, Sudan; Omo, Ethiopia; Klasies River Mouth, South Africa, and Skh~l Cave unbounded of Israel. Based on these fossils, many scientists conclude that modern H. sapiens had evolved in Africa by 130,000 years ago and started spreading to diverse parts of the world beginning on a route through the Near East sometime before 90,000 years ago.
Paleoanthropologists are engaged in an ongoing debate about where modern humans evolved and how they spread around the world. Differences in opinion rest on the question of whether the evolution of modern humans took place in a small region of Africa or over a broad area of Africa and Eurasia. By extension, opinions differ as to whether modern human populations from Africa displaced all existing populations of earlier humans, eventually resulting in their extinction.
Those who think of modern humans originating only in Africa and then spreading around the world support as their thesis the out of Africa hypothesis. Those who think modern humans evolved over a large region of Eurasia and Africa support the so-called multi-regional hypothesis. The African origins of Humanity where Richard Leakey's work at Omo-Kibish gave scientists a fresh start in their study of Homo sapiens' origins. In fact, his finds gave them two beginnings. First, they led a few researchers in the 1970s to conclude that the Kibish man was a far more likely ancestor for the Cro-Magnons, a race of early Europeans who thrived about 25,000 years ago, than their immediate predecessors in Europe, the heavyset Neanderthals. Then in the 1980s, a new reconstruction and study of the Kibish man revealed an even more startling possibility-that, and he was a far better candidate as the forbear, not just for the Cro-Magnons but for every one of us in the wake of an ignited awareness for life today, not just Europeans but all the other peoples of the world, from the Eskimos of Greenland to the Twa people of Africa, and from Australian aborigines to Native Americans. In other words, the Kibish man acted as pathfinder for a new genesis for the human species.
In the past few years, many paleontologists, anthropologists, and geneticists have come to agree that this ancient resident of the riverbanks of Ethiopia and all his Kibish kin-both far and near-could are even among our ancestors. However, it has also become clear that the evolutionary pathway of these fledgling modern humans was not an easy one. At one stage, according to genetic data, our species became as endangered as the mountain gorilla is today, its population reduced to only about 10,000 adults. Restricted to one region of Africa, but tempered in the flames of near extinction, this population went on to make a remarkable comeback. It then spread across Africa until-nearly 100,000 years ago-it had colonized much of the continent's savannas and woodlands. We see the imprint of this spread in biological studies that have revealed that races within Africa are genetically the most disparate on the planet, indicating that modern humans have existed there in larger numbers for a longer time than anywhere else.
We can also observe intriguing clues about our African origins in other less obvious but equally exciting arenas. One example comes from Congo-Kinshasa. This huge tropical African country has never assumed much importance in the field of Paleoanthropology, the branch of anthropology concerned with the investigation of ancient humans. Unlike the countries to the east, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania, Congo-Kinshasa has provided few exciting fossil sites-until recently.
In the neglected western branch of the African Rift Valley, that giant geological slash that has played such a pivotal role in human evolution, the Semliki River runs northward between two large lakes, and its waters eventually from the source of the Nile. Along its banks, sediments are being exposed that were laid down 90,000 years ago, just as Homo sapiens was making its mark across Africa.
At the town of Katanda an archaeological treasure trove: thousands of artifacts, mostly stone tools, and a few bone implements that quite astonished the archaeologists, led by the husband-and-wife team of John Yellen, of the National Science Foundation, Washington, and Alison Brooks, of George Washington University. Among the wonders they have uncovered are sophisticated bone harpoons and knives. Previously it was thought that the Cro-Magnons were the first humans to develop such delicate carving skills. Yet this very much older grouped of Homo sapiens, living in the heartland of Africa, displayed the same extraordinary skills as craft's workers. It was as if, said one observer, a prototype Pontiac car had been found in the attic of Leonardo da. Vinci.
There were other surprises for researchers, however. Apart from the finely carved implements, they found fish bones, including some from two-metre-long catfish. It seems the Katanda people were efficiently and repeatedly catching catfish during their spawning season, indicating that systematic fishing is quite an ancient human skill and not some recently acquired expertise, as many archaeologists had previously thought. In addition, the team found evidence that a Katanda site had at least two separate but similar clusters of stones and debris that looked like the residue of two distinct neighbouring groupings, signs of the possible impact of the nuclear family on society, a phenomenon that now defines the fabric of our lives.
Clearly, our African forbears were sophisticated people. Bands of them, armed with new proficiencies, like those men and women who had flourished on the banks of the Semliki, began an exodus from their African homeland. Slowly they trickled northward, and into the Levant, the region bordering the eastern Mediterranean. Then, by 80,000 years ago, small groups began spreading across the globe, via the Middle East, planting the seeds of modern humanity in Asia and later in Europe and Australia.
Today men and women conduct themselves in highly complex ways: some are uncovering the strange, indeterminate nature of matter, with its building blocks of quarks and leptons; some are probing the first few seconds of the origins of the universe fifteen billion years ago; while others are trying to develop artificial brains capable of staggering feats of calculation. Yet the intellectual tools that allow us to investigate the deepest secrets of our world are the ones that were forged during our fight for survival, in a very different set of circumstances from those that prevail today. How on earth could an animal that struggled for survival like any other creature, whose time was absorbed in a constant search for meat, nuts, and tubers, and who had to maintain constant vigilance against predators, develop the mental hardwiring needed by a nuclear physicist or an astronomer? This is a vexing issue that takes us to the very heart of our African exodus, to the journey that brought us from precarious survival on a single continent to global control.
If we can ever hope to understand the special attributes that delineate a modern human being we have to attempt to solve such puzzles. How was the Kibish man different from his Neanderthal cousins in Europe, and what evolutionary pressures led the Katanda people to develop in such crucially different ways-ironically in the heart of a continent that has for far too long been stigmatized as backward?
Nonetheless, it remains bewildering, but French researchers announced at a press conference on May 22, 1996, the discovery of a new fossil hominid species in central Chad, estimated to have lived between three million and 3.5 million years ago. The fossilized remains of a lower jaw and seven teeth were found in 1995 near Koro Toro, in the desert about 2500 km (about 1500 mi) east of the Great Rift Valley in Africa, the site of many major hominid fossil finds. The leader of the French team that discovered the fossils at Bahr-el-Ghazal, Chad-paleontologist Michel Brunet of the University of Poitiers-named the species Australopithecus bahrelghazali (from the Arabic name of the nearby River of the Gazelles). The research team published its findings in the May 20 bulletin of the French Academy of Sciences. In a letter to the journal Nature published November 16, 1995, the researchers initially classified the fossil as an example of Australopithecus afarensis, the 3.4-million-year-old species that walked upright in eastern Africa. In the letter, Brunet said that more detailed comparisons with other fossils were necessary before he could determine that the jaw came from another species, and he noted that geographic separation can produce differences among animals of the same species. After the letter was published, Brunet travelled to museums to compare the jaw with other hominid bones. The fossil combines both primitive and modern hominid features. The jaw includes the right and left premolars, both canines, and the right lateral incisor. Brunet said the strong canine teeth and the shape of the incisor resemble human teeth more than ape teeth. The chin area is more vertical than the backward-sloping chin of A. afarensis, and it lacks the strong reinforcement for chewing power found among other early hominids. However, the premolars retain primitive characteristics, such as three roots, and modern humans have only one root. Scientists said they needed more fossil material before they can place the species on the evolutionary tree. Brunet cited the find as the first evidence of hominid occupation of areas outside the Great Rift Valley and South Africa, where anthropologists have concentrated their search for hominid fossils. Other experts noted that the eroding volcanic soils in the Great Rift Valley are simply better for preserving and exposing fossils than the soils in most other regions in Africa. Although many digs have occurred in the Great Rift Valley, most scientists believe that hominids existed throughout Africa.
Researchers have conducted many genetic studies and carefully assessed fossils to determine which of these hypotheses agrees more with scientific evidence. The results of this research do not entirely confirm or reject either one. Therefore, some scientists think a compromise between the two hypotheses is the best explanation. The debate between these views has implications for how scientists understand the concept of race in humans. The question raised is whether the physical differences among modern humans evolved deep in the past or most recently, according to the out of Africa hypothesis, also known as the replacement hypothesis, early populations of modern humans from Africa migrated to other regions and entirely replaced existing populations of archaic humans. The replaced populations would have included the Neanderthals and any surviving groups of Homo erectus. Supporters of this view note that many modern human skeletal traits evolved recently,-within the past 200,000 years or so suggesting a single, common origin. In addition, the anatomical similarities shared by all modern human populations far outweigh those shared by premodern and modern humans within particular geographic regions. Furthermore, biological research indicated that most new species of organisms, including mammals, arose from small, geographically isolated populations.
According to the multi-regional hypothesis, also known as the continuity hypothesis, the evolution of modern humans began when Homo erectus spread throughout much of Eurasia around one million years ago. Regional populations retained some unique anatomical features for hundreds of thousands of years, but they also mated with populations from neighbouring regions, exchanging heritable traits with each other. This exchange of heritable traits is known as gene flow.
Through gene flow, populations of H. erectus passed on a variety of increasingly modern characteristics, such as increases in brain size, across their geographic range. Gradually this would have resulted in the evolution of more modern looking humans throughout Africa and Eurasia. The substantial differences among our citizenries today, are, then, a sortal result from hundreds of thousands of years of regional evolution. This is the concept of continuity. For instance, modern East Asian populations have some skull features that scientists also see in H. erectus fossils from that region.
Some critics of the multi-regional hypothesis claim that it wrongly advocates a scientific belief in race and could be used to encourage racism. Supporters of the theory point out, however, that their position does not imply that modern races evolved in isolation from each other, or that racial differences justify racism. Instead, the theory holds that gene flow linked different populations together. These links allowed progressively more modern features, no matter where they arose, to spread from region to region and eventually become universal among humans.
Scientists have weighed the out of Africa and multi-regional hypotheses against both genetic and fossil evidence. The results do not unanimously support either one, but weigh more heavily in favour of the out of Africa hypothesis.
Geneticists have studied difference in the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) of different populations of humans. DNA is the molecule that contains our heritable genetic code. Differences in human DNA result from mutations in DNA structure. Mutations may result from exposure to external elements such as solar radiation or certain chemical compounds, while others occur naturally at random.
Geneticists have calculated rates at which mutations can be expected to occur over time. Dividing the total number of genetic differences between two populations by an expected rate of mutation provides an estimate of the time when the two shared a common ancestor. Many estimates of evolutionary ancestry rely on studies of the DNA in cell structures called mitochondria. This DNA is called mtDNA (mitochondrial DNA). Unlike DNA from the nucleus of a cell, which codes for most of the traits an organism inherits from both parents, mtDNA inheritance passes only from a mother to her offspring. MtDNA also accumulates mutations about ten times faster than does DNA in the cell nucleus (the location of most DNA). The structure of mtDNA changes so quickly that scientists can easily measure the differences between one human population and another. Two closely related populations should have only minor differences in their mtDNA. Conversely, two very distantly related populations should have large differences in their mtDNA
MtDNA research into modern human origins has produced two major findings. First, the entire amount of variation in mtDNA across human populations is small in comparison with that of other animal species. This means that all human mtDNA originated from a single since which ancestral lineage-specifically, a single female-of late has been mutating ever. Most estimates of the mutation rate of mtDNA suggest that this female ancestor lived about 200,000 years ago. In addition, the mtDNA of African populations varies more than that of peoples in other continents. This suggests that the mtDNA of African populations sustained of change for a longer time than in populations of any other region. That all living people inherited their mtDNA from one woman in Africa, who is sometimes called the Mitochondrial Eve. Some geneticists and anthropologists have concluded from this evidence that modern humans originated in a small population in Africa and spread from there.
MtDNA studies have weaknesses, however, including the following four. First, the estimated rate of mtDNA mutation varies from study to study, and some estimates put the date of origin closer to 850,000 years ago, the time of Homo erectus. Second, mtDNA makes up a small part of the total genetic material that humans inherit. The rest of our genetic material-about 400,000 times more than the mtDNA,-came from many individuals living at the time of the African Eve, conceivably from many different regions. Third, the time at which modern mtDNA began to diversify does not necessarily coincide with the origin of modern human biological traits and cultural abilities. Fourth, the smaller amount of modern mtDNA diversity but Africa could result from times when European and Asian populations declined in numbers, perhaps due to climate changes.
Despite these criticisms, many geneticists continue to favour the out of Africa hypothesis of modern human origins. Studies of nuclear DNA also suggest an African origin for a variety of genes. Furthermore, in a remarkable series of studies in the late 1990's, scientists recovered mtDNA from the first Neanderthal fossil found in Germany and two other Neanderthal fossils. In each case, the mtDNA does not closely match that of modern humans. This finding suggests that at least some Neanderthal populations had diverged from the line to modern humans by 500,000 to 600,000 years ago. This also suggests that Neanderthals represent a separate species from modern H. sapiens. In another study, however, mtDNA extracted from a 62,000 -year-old Australian H. sapiens fossil was found to differ significantly from modern human mtDNA, suggesting a much wider range of mtDNA variation within H. sapiens than was previously believed. According to the Australian researchers, this finding lends support to the multi-regional hypothesis because it shows that different populations of H. sapiens, possibly including Neanderthals, could have evolved independently in different parts of the world.
As with genetic research, fossil evidence also does not entirely support or refute either of the competing hypotheses of modern human origins. However, many scientists see the balance of evidence favouring an African origin of modern H. sapiens within the past 200,000 years. The oldest known modern-looking skulls come from Africa and date from perhaps 130,000 years ago. The next oldest comes from the Near East, where they date from about 90,000 years ago. Fossils of modern humans in Europe do not exist in advancing their precedence, in as much as lacking generative qualities that extend no further than 40,000 years ago. In addition, the first modern humans in Europe-often called Cro-Magnon people -had elongated lower leg bones, as did African populations adapted too warm, tropical climates. This suggests that populations from warmer regions replaced those in colder European regions, such as the Neanderthals.
Fossils also show that populations of modern humans lived when and in the same regions as did populations of Neanderthals and Homo erectus, but that each retained its distinctive physical features. The different groups overlapped in the Near East and Southeast Asia for between about 30,000 and 50,000 years. The maintenance of physical differences for this amount of time implies that archaically and modern humans could either not or generally did not interbreed. To some scientists, this also means that the Neanderthals belong to a separate species, H. neanderthalensis, and that migratory populations of modern humans entirely replaced archaic humans in both Europe and eastern Asia.
On the other hand, fossils of archaic and modern humans in some regions show continuity in certain physical characteristics. These similarities may indicate multi-regional evolution. For example, both archaic and modern skulls of eastern Asia have flatter cheek and nasal areas than do skulls from other regions. By contrast, the same parts of the face project forward in the skulls of both archaic and modern humans of Europe. If these traits were influenced primarily by genetic inheritance rather than environmental factors, archaic humans may have produced modern humans in some regions or at least interbred with migrant modern-looking humans.
Each of the competing major hypotheses of modern human origins has its strengths and weaknesses. Genetic evidence appears to support the out of Africa hypothesis. In the western half of Eurasia and in Africa, this hypothesis also seems the better explanation, particularly as for the apparent replacement of Neanderthals by modern populations. Also, the multi-regional hypothesis appears to explain some of the regional continuity found in East Asian populations.
Therefore, many paleoanthropologists advocate a theory of modern human origins that combine elements of the out of Africa and the multi-regional hypotheses. Humans with modern features may have initiatively emerged in Africa or come together there as a result of gene flow with populations from other regions. These African populations may then have replaced archaic humans in certain regions, such as western Europe and the Near East. Still, elsewhere,-especially in East Asia-gene flow may have occurred among local populations of archaic and modern humans, resulting in distinct and enduring regional characteristics.
All three of these views,-the two competing positions and the compromiser acknowledge the strong biological unity of all people. In the multi-regional hypothesis, this unity results from hundreds of thousands of years of continued gene flow among all human populations. According to the out of Africa hypothesis, on the other hand, similarities among all living human populations result from a recent common origin. The compromise position accepts both as reasonable and compatible explanations of modern human origins.
The story of human evolution is as much about the development of cultural behaviour as it is about changes in physical appearance. The term culture, in anthropology, traditionally refers to all human creations and activities governed by social customs and rules. It includes elements such as technology, language, and art. Human cultural behaviour depends on the social transfer of information from one generation to the next, which it depends on a sophisticated system of communication, such as language.
The term culture has often been used to distinguish the behaviour of humans from that of other animals. However, some nonhuman animals also appear to have forms of learned cultural behaviours. For instance, different groups of chimpanzees use different techniques to capture termites for food using sticks. Also, in some regions chimps use stones or pieces of wood for cracking open nuts. Chimps in other regions do not practice this behaviour, although their forests have similar nut trees and materials for making tools. These regional differences resemble traditions that people pass from generation to generation. Traditions are a fundamental aspect of culture, and paleoanthropologists assume that the earliest humans also had some types of traditions.
However, modern humans differ from other animals, and probably many early human species. In that, they actively teach each other and are able to pass on an accumulative amounts of resulting knowledge. People also have a uniquely long period of learning before adulthood, and the physical and mental capacity for language. Language of all forms spoken, signed, and written,-provides a medium for communicating vast amounts of information, much more than any other animal could probably transmit through gestures and vocalizations.
Scientists have traced the evolution of human cultural behaviour through the study of archaeological artifacts, such as tools, and related evidence, such as the charred remains of cooked food. Artifacts show that throughout much of human evolution, culture has developed slowly. During the Palaeolithic, or early Stone Age, basic techniques for making stone tools changed very little for periods of well more than a million years.
Human fossils also provide information about how culture has evolved and what effects it has had on human life. For example, over the past 30,000 years, the basic anatomy of humans has undergone only one prominent change: The bones of the average human skeleton have become much smaller and thinner. Innovations in the making and usage of tools and their obtaining food: results of cultural evolution may have led to more efficient and less physically taxing lifestyles, and thus caused changes in the skeleton.
Culture has played a prominent role in the evolution of Homo sapiens. Within the last 60,000 years, people have migrated to settle most unoccupied regions of the world, such as small island chains and the continents of Australia and the Americas. These migrations depended on developments in transportation, hunting and fishing tools, shelter, and clothing. Within the past 30,000 years, cultural evolution has sped up dramatically. This change shows up in the archaeological record as a rapid expansion of stone tool types and Toolmaking techniques, and in works of art and indications of evolving religion, such as burials. By 10,000 years ago, people first began to harvest and cultivate grains and to domesticate animals-a fundamental change in the ecological relationship between human beings and other life on Earth. The development of agriculture gave people larger quantities and more stable supplies of food, which set the stage for the rise of the first civilizations. Today, culture and particularly technology dominates human life.
Paleoanthropologists and archaeologists have studied many topics in the evolution of human cultural behaviour. These have included the evolution of (1) social life; (2) subsistence (the acquisition and production of food); (3) the making and using of tools; (4) environmental adaptation; (5) symbolic thought and its expression through language, art, and religion; and (6) the development of agriculture and the rise of civilizations.
Most primate species, including the African apes, live in social groups of varying size and complexity. Within their groups, individuals often have multifaceted roles, based on age, sex, status, social skills, and personality. The discovery in 1975 at Hadar, Ethiopia, of a group of several Australopithecus afarensis individuals who died together 3.2 million years ago appears to confirm that early humans lived in social groups. Scientists have referred to this collection of fossils as The First Family.
One of the first physicals changes in the evolution of humans from apes-a decrease in the size of male canine teeth-also, indicating a change in social relations. Male apes sometimes use their large canines to threaten (or sometimes fight with) other males of their species, usually over access to females, territory, or food. The evolution of small canines in Australopiths implies that males had either developed other methods of threatening each other or become more cooperative. In addition, both male and female Australopiths had small canines, indicating a reduction of sexual dimorphism from that in apes. Yet, although sexual dimorphism in canine size decreased in Australopiths, males were still much larger than females. Thus, male Australopiths might have competed aggressively with each other based on sheer size and strength, and the social life of humans may not have differed much from that of apes until later times.
Scientists believe that several of the most important changes from apelike to characteristically human social life occurred in species of the genus Homo, whose members show even less sexual dimorphism. These changes, which may have occurred at different times, included, (1) prolonged maturation of infants, including an extended period during which they required intensive care from their parents; (2) special bonds of sharing and exclusive mating between particular males and females, called pair-bonding; and (3) the focus of social activity at a home base, a safe refuge in a special location known to family or group members.
Humans, who have a large brain, has a prolonged period of infant development and childhood because the brain takes a long time too mature. Since the Australopiths brain was not much larger than that of a chimp, some scientists think that the earliest humans had a more apelike rate of growth, which is far more rapid than that of modern humans. This view is supported by studies of Australopiths fossils looking at tooth development-a good indicator of overall body development.
In addition, the human brain becomes very large as it develops, so a woman must give birth at an early stage of development in order for the infant's head to fit through her birth canal. Thus, human babies require a long period of care to reach a stage of development at which they depend less on their parents. In contrast with a modern female, a female Australopiths could give birth to a baby at an advanced stage of development because its brain would not be too large to pass through the birth canal. The need to give birth early-and therefore to provide more infant care,-may have evolved around the time of the middle Homo's species Homo's ergaster. This species had a brain significantly larger than that of the Australopiths, but a narrow birth canal.
Pair-bonding, usually of a short duration, occurs in a variety of primate species. Some scientists speculate that prolonged bonds developed in humans along with increased sharing of food. Among primates, humans have a distinct type of food-sharing behaviour. People will delay eating food until they have returned with it to the location of other members of their social group. This type of food sharing may have arisen at the same time as the need for intensive infant care, probably by the time of H. ergaster. By devoting himself to a particular female and sharing food with her, a male could increase the chances of survival for his own offspring.
Humans have lived as foragers for millions of years. Foragers obtain food when and where it is available over a broad territory. Modern-day foragers (also known as hunter-gatherers)-such as the San people in the Kalahari Desert of southern Africa,-also set up central campsites, or home bases, and divide work duties between men and women. Women gather readily available plant and animal foods, while men take on the often less successful task of hunting. Female and male family members and relatives bring together their food to share at their home base. The modern form of the home base-that also serves as a haven for raising children and caring for the sick and elderly-may have first developed with middle Homo after about 1.7 million years ago. However, the first evidence of hearths and shelters common to all modern home bases,-comes from only after 500,000 years ago. Thus, a modern form of social life may not have developed until late in human evolution.
Human subsistence refers to the types of food humans eat, the technology used in and methods of obtaining or producing food, and the ways in which social groups or societies organize them for getting, making, and distributing food. For millions of years, humans probably fed on-the-go, much as other primates do. The lifestyle associated with this feeding strategy is generally organized around small, family-based social groups that take advantage of different food sources at different times of year.
The early human diet probably resembled that of closely related primate species. The great apes eat mostly plant foods. Many primates also eat easily obtained animal foods such as insects and bird eggs. Among the few primates that hunt, chimpanzees will prey on monkeys and even small gazelles. The first humans probably also had a diet based mostly on plant foods. In addition, they undoubtedly ate some animal foods and might have done some hunting. Human subsistence began to diverge from that of other primates with the production and use of the first stone tools. With this development, the meat and marrow (the inner, fat-rich tissue of bones) of large mammals became a part of the human diet. Thus, with the advent of stone tools, the diet of early humans became distinguished in an important way from that of apes.
Scientists have found broken and butchered fossil bones of antelopes, zebras, and other comparably sized animals at the oldest archaeological sites, which go of a date from some 2.5 million years ago. With the evolution of late Homo, humans began to hunt even the largest animals on Earth, including mastodons and mammoths, members of the elephant family. Agriculture and the of animals arose only in the recent past, with H. sapiens.
Paleoanthropologists have debated whether early members of the modern human genus were aggressive hunters, peaceful plant gatherers, or opportunistic scavengers. Many scientists once thought that predation and the eating of meat had strong effects on early human evolution. This hunting hypothesis suggested that early humans in Africa survived particularly arid periods by aggressively hunting animals with primitive stone or bone tools. Supporters of this hypothesis thought that hunting and competition with carnivores powerfully influenced the evolution of human social organization and behaviour; Toolmaking; anatomy, such as the unique structure of the human hand; and intelligence.
Beginning in the 1960's, studies of apes cast doubt on the hunting hypothesis. Researchers discovered that chimpanzees cooperate in hunts of at least small animals, such as monkeys. Hunting did not, therefore, entirely distinguish early humans from apes, and therefore hunting alone may not have determined the path of early human evolution. Some scientists instead argued in favour of the importance of food-sharing in early human life. According to a food-sharing hypothesis, cooperation and sharing within family groups-instead of aggressive hunting-strongly influenced the path of human evolution.
Scientists once thought that archaeological sites as much as two million years old provided evidence to support the food-sharing hypothesis. Some of the oldest archaeological sites were places where humans brought food and stone tools together. Scientists thought that these sites represented home bases, with many social features of modern hunter-gatherers campsites, including the sharing of food between pair-bonded males and females.
Critique of the food-sharing hypothesis resulted from more careful study of animal bones from the early archaeological sites. Microscopic analysis of these bones revealed the marks of human tools and carnivore teeth, indicating that both humans and potential predators,-such as, hyenas, cats, and jackals-were active at these sites. This evidence suggested that what scientists had thought were home bases where early humans shared food were in fact food-processing sites that humans abandoned to predators. Thus, evidence did not clearly support the idea of food-sharing among early humans.
The new research also suggested a different view of early human subsistence-that early humans scavenged meat and bone marrow from dead animals and did little hunting. According to this scavenging hypothesis, early humans opportunistically took parts of animal carcasses left by predators, and then used stone tools to remove marrow from the bones.
Observations that many animals, such as antelope, often die off in the dry season make the scavenging hypothesis quite plausible. Early Toolmaker would have had plenty of opportunity to scavenge animal fat and meat during dry times of the year. However, other archaeological studies,-and a better appreciation of the importance of hunting among chimpanzees suggests that the scavenging hypothesis be too narrow. Many scientists now believe that early humans both scavenged and hunted. Evidence of carnivore tooth marks on bones cut by early human Toolmaker suggests that the humans scavenged at least the larger of the animals they ate. They also ate a variety of plant foods. Some disagreement remains, however, about how much early humans relied on hunting, especially the hunting of smaller animals.
Scientists debate when humans first began hunting on a regular basis. For instance, elephant fossils were made-known to be found existent with tools made by Middle Homo once led researchers to the idea that members of this species were hunters of big game. However, the simple association of animal bones and tools at the same site does not necessarily mean that early humans had killed the animals or eaten their meat. Animals may die in many ways, and natural forces can accidentally place fossils next to tools. Recent excavations at Olorgesailie, Kenya, show that H. erectus cut meat from elephant carcasses but do not reveal whether these humans were regular or specialized hunters
Humans who lived outside Africa,-especially in colder temperate climates almost needed to eat more meat than their African counterparts. Humans in temperate Eurasia would have had to learn about which plants they could safely eat, and the number of available plant foods would drop significantly during the winter. Still, although scientists have found very few fossils of edible or eaten plants at early human sites, early inhabitants of Europe and Asia probably did eat plant foods besides meat.
Sites that provide the clearest evidence of early hunting include Boxgrove, England, where about 500,000 years ago people trapped several large game animals between a watering hole and the side of a cliff and then slaughtered them. At Schningen, Germany, a site about 400,000 years old, scientists have found wooden spears with sharp ends that were well designed for throwing and probably used in hunting large animals.
Neanderthals and other archaic humans seem to have eaten whatever animals were available at a particular time and place. So, for example, in European Neanderthal sites, the number of bones of reindeer (a cold-weather animal) and red deer (a warm-weather animal) changed depending on what the climate had been like. Neanderthals probably also combined hunting and scavenging to obtain animal protein and fat.
For at least the past 100,000 years, various human groups have eaten foods from the ocean or coast, such as shellfish and some sea mammals and birds. Others began fishing in interior rivers and lakes. Between probably 90,000 and 80,000 years ago people in Katanda, in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, caught large catfish using a set of barbed bone points, the oldest known specialized fishing implements. The oldest stone tips for arrows or spears date from about 50,000 to 40,000 years ago. These technological advances, probably first developed by early modern humans, indicate an expansion in the kinds of foods humans could obtain. Beginning 40,000 years ago humans began making even more significant advances in hunting dangerous animals and large herds, and in exploiting ocean resources. People cooperated in large hunting expeditions in which they killed many reindeer, bison, horses, and other animals of the expansive grasslands that existed at that time. In some regions, people became specialists in hunting certain kinds of animals. The familiarity these people had with the animals they hunted appears in sketches and paintings on cave walls, dating from as much as 32,000 years ago. Hunters also used the bones, ivory, and antlers of their prey to create art and beautiful tools. In some areas, such as the central plains of North America that once teemed with a now-extinct type of large bison (Bison occidentalis), hunting may have contributed to the extinction of entire species.
The making and use of tools alone probably did not distinguish early humans from their ape predecessors. Instead, humans made the important breakthrough of using one tool to make another. Specifically, they developed the technique of precisely hitting one stone against another, known as knapping. Stone Toolmaking characterized the period that on give occasion to have to do with the Stone Age, which began at least 2.5 million years ago in Africa and lasted until the development of metal tools within the last 7,000 years (at different times in different parts of the world). Although early humans may have made stone tools before 2.5 million years ago, Toolmaker may not have remained long enough in one spot to leave clusters of tools that an archaeologist would notice today.
The earliest simple form of stone Toolmaking involved breaking and shaping an angular rock by hitting it with a palm-sized round rock known as a hammerstone. Scientists refer to tools made in this way as Oldowan, after Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, a site from which many such tools have come. The Oldowan tradition lasted for about one million years. Oldowan tools include large stones with a chopping edge, and small, sharp flakes that could be used to scrape and slice. Sometimes Oldowan Toolmaker used anvil stones (flat rocks found or placed on the ground) on which hard fruits or nuts could be broken open. Chimpanzees are known to do this today.
Humans have always adapted to their environments by adjusting their behaviour. For instance, early Australopiths moved both in the trees and on the ground, which probably helped them survive environmental fluctuations between wooded and more open habitats. Early Homo adapted by making stone tools and transporting their food over long distances, thereby increasing the variety and quantities of different foods they could eat. An expanded and flexible diet would have helped these Toolmaker survive unexpected changes in their environment and food supply
When populations of H. erectus moved into the temperate regions of Eurasia, but they faced unseasoned challenges to survival. During the colder seasons they had to either move away or seek shelter, such as in caves. Some of the earliest definitive evidence of cave dwellers dates from around 800,000 years ago at the site of Atapuerca in northern Spain. This site may have been home too early H. heidelbergensis populations. H. erectus also used caves for shelter.
Eventually, early humans learned to control fire and to use it to create warmth, cook food, and protect themselves from other animals. The oldest known fire hearths date from between 450,000 and 300,000 years ago, at sites such as Bilzingsleben, Germany; Verteszöllös, Hungary; and Zhoukoudian (Chou-k ou-tien), China. African sites as old as 1.6 million to 1.2 million years contain burned bones and reddened sediments, but many scientists find such evidence too ambiguous to prove that humans controlled fire. Early populations in Europe and Asia may also have worn animal hides for warmth during glacial periods. The oldest known bone needles, which indicate the development of sewing and tailored clothing, date from about 30,000 to 26,000 years ago.
Behaviour relates directly to the development of the human brain, and particularly the cerebral cortex, the part of the brain that allows abstract thought, beliefs, and expression through language. Humans communicate through the use of symbols-ways of referring to things, ideas, and feelings that communicate meaning from one individual to another but that need not have any direct connection to what they identify. For instance, a word, or utterance is only one type of symbolization, in that of doing or not as the usually related directional thing or, perhaps, as an ideal symbol represents; it is nonrepresentational English-speaking people use the word lion to describe a lion, not because a dangerous feline looks like the letters I i-o-n, but because these letters together have a meaning created and understood by people.
People can also paint abstract pictures or play pieces of music that evoke emotions or ideas, even though emotions and ideas have no form or sound. In addition, people can conceive of and believe in supernatural beings and powers-abstract concepts that symbolize real-world events such as the creation of Earth and the universe, the weather, and the healing of the sick. Thus, symbolic thought lies at the heart of three hallmarks of modern human culture: language, art, and religion.
In language, people creatively join words together in an endless variety of sentences, hopefully graduating to phrases and perhaps, the paragraphs and lastly with the grandiosities fulfilled in writing a book. Each set-category has a distinct meaning as accorded to its set-classification by mental rules, or grammar. Language provides the ability to communicate complex concepts. It also allows people to exchange information about both past and future events, about objects that are not present, and about complex philosophical or technical concepts
Language gives people many adaptive advantages, including the ability to plan, to communicate the location of food or dangers to other members of a social group, and to tell stories that unify a group, such as mythologies and histories. However, words, sentences, and languages cannot be preserved like bones or tools, so the evolution of language is one of the most difficult topics to investigate through scientific study.
It appears that modern humans have an inborn instinct for language. Under normal conditions not developing language is almost impossible for a person, and people everywhere go through the same stages of increasing language skill at about the same ages. While people appear to have inborn genetic information for developing language, they learn specific languages based on the cultures from which they come and the experiences they have in life.
The ability of humans to have language depends on the complex structure of the modern brain, which has many interconnected, specific areas dedicated to the development and control of language. The complexity of the brain structures necessary for language suggests that it probably took a long time to evolve. While paleoanthropologists would like to know when these important parts of the brain evolved, endocasts (inside impressions) of early human skulls do not provide enough detail to show this.
Some scientists think that even the early Australopiths had some ability to understand and use symbols. Support for this view comes from studies with chimpanzees. A few chimps and other apes have been taught to use picture symbols or American Sign Language for simple communication. Nevertheless, it appears that language-as well as art and religious ritual-became vital aspects of human life only during the past 100,000 years, primarily within our own species.
Humans also express symbolic thought through many forms of art, including painting, sculpture, and music. The oldest known object of possible symbolic and artistic value dates from about 250,000 years ago and comes from the site of Berekhat Ram, Israel. Scientists have interpreted this object, a figure carved into a small piece of volcanic rock, as a representation of the outline of a female body. Only a few other possible art objects are known from between 200,000 and 50,000 years ago. These items, from western Europe and usually attributed to Neanderthals, include two simple pendants-a tooth and a bone with bored holes and several grooved or polished fragments of tooth and bone.
Sites dating from at least 400,000 years ago contain fragments of red and black pigment. Humans might have used these pigments to decorate bodies or perishable items, such as wooden tools or clothing of animal hides, but this evidence would not have survived to today. Solid evidence of the sophisticated use of pigments for symbolic purposes-such as in religious rituals,-comes only from after 40,000 years ago. From early in this period, researchers have found carefully made types of crayons used in painting and evidence that humans burned pigments to create a range of colours.
People began to create and use advanced types of symbolic objects between about 50,000 and 30,000 years ago. Much of this art appears to have been used in rituals-possibly ceremonies to ask spirit beings for a successful hunt. The archaeological record shows a tremendous blossoming of art between 30,000 and 15,000 years ago. During this period people adorned themselves with intricate jewellery of ivory, bone, and stone. They carved beautiful figurines representing animals and human forms. Many carvings, sculptures, and paintings depict stylized images of the female body. Some scientists think such female figurines represent fertility.
Early wall paintings made sophisticated use of texture and colour. The area of what is now. Southern France contains many famous sites of such paintings. These include the caves of Chauvet, which contain art more than 30,000 years old, and Lascaux, in which paintings date from as much as 18,000 years ago. In some cases, artists painted on walls that can be reached only with special effort, such as by crawling. The act of getting to these paintings gives them a sense of mystery and ritual, as it must have to the people who originally viewed them, and archaeologists refer to some of the most extraordinary painted chambers as sanctuaries. Yet no one knows for sure what meanings these early paintings and engravings had for the people who made them.
Graves from Europe and western Asia indicate that the Neanderthals were the first humans to bury their dead. Some sites contain very shallow graves, which group or family members may have dug simply to remove corpses from sight. In other cases it appears that groups may have observed rituals of grieving for the dead or communicating with spirits. Some researchers have claimed that grave goods, such as meaty animal bones or flowers, had been placed with buried bodies, suggesting that some Neanderthal groups might have believed in an afterlife. In a large proportion of Neanderthal burials, the corpse had its legs and arms drawn in close to its chest, which could indicate a ritual burial position.
Other researchers have challenged these interpretations, however. They suggest that perhaps the Neanderthals had practically rather than religious reasons for positioning dead bodies. For instance, a body manipulated into a fetal position would need only a small hole for burial, making the job of digging a grave easier. In addition, the animal bones and flower pollen near corpses could have been deposited by accident or without religious intention.
Many scientists once thought that fossilized bones of cave bears (a now-extinct species of large bear) found in Neanderthal caves indicated that these people had what has been referred to as a cave bear cult, in which they worshipped the bears as powerful spirits. However, after careful study researchers concluded that the cave bears probably died while hibernating and that Neanderthals did not collect their bones or worship them. Considering current evidence, the case for religion among Neanderthal prevails upon disputatiousness.
One of the most important developments in human cultural behaviours occurred when people began to domesticate (control the breeding of) plants and animals. and the advent of agriculture led to the development of dozens of staple crops (foods that forms the basis of an entire diet) in temperate and tropical regions around the world. Almost the entire population of the world today depends on just four of these major crops: wheat, rice, corn, and potatoes.
The growth of farming and animal herding initiated one of the most remarkable changes ever in the relationship between humans and the natural environment. The change first began just 10,000 years ago in the Near East and has accelerated very rapidly since then. It also occurred independently in other places, including areas of Mexico, China, and South America. Since the first of plants and animals, many species over large areas of the planet have come under human control. The overall number of plant and animal species has decreased, while the populations of a few species needed to support large human populations have grown immensely. In areas dominated by people, interactions between plants and animals usually fall under the control of a single species-Homo sapiens.
By the time of the initial transition to plant and animal, the cold, glacial landscapes of 18,000 years ago had long since given way to warmer and wetter environments. At first, people adapted to these changes by using a wider range of natural resources. Later they began to focus on a few of the most abundant and hardy types of plants and animals. The plant's people began to use in large quantities included cereal grains, such as wheat in western Asia; wild varieties of rice in eastern Asia; and maize, of which corn is one variety, in what is now Mexico. Some of the animals people first began to herd included wild goats in western Asia, wild ancestors of chickens in eastern Asia, and llamas in South America.
By carefully collecting plants and controlling wild herd animals, people encouraged the development of species with characteristics favourable for growing, herding, and eating. This process of selecting certain species and controlling their breeding eventually created new species of plants, such as oats, barley, and potatoes, eatable animals, including cattle, sheep, and pigs. From these domesticated plant and animal species, people obtained important products, such as flour, milk, and wool.
By harvesting and herding domesticated species, people could store large quantities of plant foods, such as seeds and tubers, and have a ready supply of meat and milk. These readily available supplies gave people an abounding overindulgence-designate with a term food security. In contrast, the foraging lifestyle of earlier human populations never provided them with a significant store of food. With increased food supplies, agricultural peoples could settle into villages and have more children. The new reliance on agriculture and change to settled village life also had some negative effects. As the average diet became more dependent on large quantities of one or a few staple crops, people became more susceptible to diseases brought on by a lack of certain nutrients. A settled lifestyle also increased contact between people and between people and their refuse and waste matter, both of which acted to increase the incidence and transmission of disease.
People responded to the increasing population density-and a resulting overuse of farming and grazing lands-in several ways. Some people moved to settle entirely new regions. Others devised ways of producing food in larger quantities and more quickly. The simplest way was to expand onto new fields for planting and new pastures to support growing herds of livestock. Many populations also developed systems of irrigation and fertilization that allowed them to reuse crop-land and to produce greater amounts of food on existing fields.
The rise of civilizations-the large and complex types of societies in which most people still live today-developed along with surplus food production. People of high status eventually used food surpluses as a way to pay for labour and to create alliances among groups, often against other groups. In this way, large villages could grow into city-states (urban centres that governed them) and eventually empires covering vast territories. With surplus food production, many people could work exclusively in political, religious, or military positions, or in artistic and various skilled vocations. Command of food surpluses also enabled rulers to control labourers, such as in slavery. All civilizations developed based on such hierarchical divisions of status and vocation.
The earliest civilization arose more than 7,000 years ago in Sumer in what is now Iraq. Sumer grew powerful and prosperous by 5,000 years ago, when it centred on the city-state of Ur. The region containing Sumer, known as Mesopotamia, was the same area in which people had first domesticated animals and plants. Other centres of early civilizations include the Nile Valley of Northeast Africa, the Indus. Valley of South Asia, the Yellow River Valley of East Asia, the Oaxaca and Mexico valleys and the Yucatán region of Central America, and the Andean region of South America, China and Inca Empire
All early civilizations had some common features. Some of these included a bureaucratic political body, the military, a body of religious leadership, large urban centres, monumental buildings and other works of architecture, networks of trade, and food surpluses created through extensive systems of farming. Many early civilizations also had systems of writing, numbers and mathematics, and astronomy (with calendars); road systems; a formalized body of law; and facilities for education and the punishment of crimes. With the rise of civilizations, human evolution entered a phase vastly different from all before which came. Before this time, humans had lived in small, family-centred groups essentially exposed to and controlled by forces of nature. Several thousand years after the rise of the first civilizations, most people now live in societies of millions of unrelated people, all separated from the natural environment by houses, buildings, automobiles, and numerous other inventions and technologies. Culture will continue to evolve quickly and in unforeseen directions, and these changes will, in turn, influence the physical evolution of Homo sapiens and any other human species to come.
During the fist two billion years of evolution, bacteria were the sole inhabitants of the earth, and the emergence of a more complex form is associated with networking and symbiosis. During these two billion years, prokaryote, or organisms composed of cells with no nucleus (namely bacteria), transformed he earth's surface and atmosphere. It was the interaction of these simple organisms that resulted in te complex processes of fermentation, photosynthesis, oxygen breathing, and the removal of nitrogen gas from the air. Such processes would not have evolved, however, if these organisms were atomized in the Darwinian sense or if the force of interaction between parts existed only outside the parts.
In the life of bacteria, bits of genetic material within organisms are routinely and rapidly transferred to other organisms. At any given time, an individual bacteria have the use of accessory gene, often from very different strains, which execute unprepared functions are not carried through by its own DNA. Some of this genetic material can be incorporated into the DNA of the bacterium and some may be passed on to other bacteria. What this picture indicates, as Margulis and Sagan put it, is that ‘all the worlds' bacteria have access to a single gene pool and hence to the adaptive mechanisms of the entire bacterial kingdom.’
Since the whole of this gene pool operates in some sense within the parts, the speed of recombination is much greater than that allowed by mutation alone, or by random changes inside parts that alter interaction between parts. The existence of the whole within parts explains why bacteria can accommodate change on a worldwide cale in a few years. If the only mechanism at work were mutation inside organisms, millions of years would require for bacteria to adapt to a global change in the conditions for survival. ‘By constantly and rapidly adapting to environmental conditions,’ wrote Margukis and Sagan, ‘the organisms of the microcosm support the entire biota, their global exchange network ultimately affecting every living plant and animal.’
The discovery of symbiotic alliance between organisms that become permanent is other aspect of the modern understanding of evolution that appears to challenge Darwin's view of universal struggle between atomized individual organisms. For example, the mitochondria fond outside the nucleus of modern cells allows the cell to utilize oxygen and to exist in an oxygen-rich environment. Although mitochondria enacts upon integral and essential functions in the life of the cell, they have their own genes composed of DNA, reproduced by simple division, and did so at time different from the rest of the cells.
The most reasonable explanation for this extraordinary alliance between mitochondria and the rest of the cell that oxygen-breathing bacteria in primeval seas combined with the organisms. These ancestors of modern mitochondria provided waste disposal and oxygen-derived energy in exchange for food and shelter and evolved via symbiosis more complex forms of oxygen-breathing life, since the whole of these organisms was lager than the sum of their symbiotic pats, this allowed for life functions that could not be carried to completion by the mere collection of pasts. The existence of the whole within the parts coordinates metabolic functions and overall organization
Awaiting upon the unformidable future, of which the future has framed its proposed modern understanding of the relationship between mind and world within the larger content of the history of mathematical physics, the origin and extensions of the classical view of the functional preliminaries in association with scientific knowledge, and the various ways that physics has attempted to prevent previous challenges to the efficacy of classical epistemology. There is no basis in contemporary physics or biology for believing in the stark Cartesian division between mind and world that some have moderately described as ‘the disease of the Western mind.' The dialectic orchestrations will serve as background for understanding a new relationship between parts and wholes in physics, with a similar view of that relationship that has emerged in the so-called ‘new-biology' and in recent studies of the evolution of a scientific understanding to a more conceptualized representation of ideas, and includes its ally ‘content'.
Recent studies on the manner in which the brains of our ancestors evolved the capacity to acquire and use complex language systems also present us with a new view of the relationship between parts and wholes in the evolution of human consciousness. These studies suggest that cognitive narrations cannot fully explain the experience of consciousness about the physical substrates of consciousness, or that the whole that corresponds with any moment of conscious awareness is an emergent phenomenon that a stable and cohering cognizance cannot fully explain as to the sum of its constituent parts. This also suggests that the pre-adaptive change in the hominid brain that enhanced the capacity to use symbolic communication over a period of 2.5 million years cannot be fully explained as to the usual dynamics of Darwinian evolution.
Recent studies on the manner in which the brains of our ancestors evolved the capacity to acquire and use complex language systems also present us with a new view of the relationship between parts and wholes in the evolution of human consciousness. These studies suggest that the experience of consciousness cannot be fully explained through the physical substrates of consciousness, or that the whole that corresponds with any moment of conscious awareness is an emergent phenomenon that cannot be fully explained as to the sum of its constituent parts. This also suggests that the pre-adaptive change in the hominid brain that enhanced the capacity to use symbolic communication over a period of 2.5 million years cannot be fully explained as for the usual dynamics of Darwinian evolution
Part and wholes in Darwinian theory cannot reveal the actual character of living organisms because that organism exists only in relation to the whole of biological life. What Darwin did not anticipate, however, is that the whole that is a living organism appears to exist in some sense within the parts, and that more complex life forms evolved in precesses in which synergy and cooperation between parts (organisms) result in new wholes (more complex of parts) withe emergent properties that do not exist in the collection of parts. More remarkable, this new understanding of the relationship between part and whole in biology seems very analogous to the disclosed by the discovery of non-locality in physics. We should stress, however, that this view of the relationship between parts and wholes in biologic reality is most orthodox and may occasion some controversy in the community of biological scientists.
Since Darwin's understanding of the relations between part and whole was essentially classical and mechanistic, the new understanding of this relationship is occasioning some revising of his theory of evolution. Darwin made his theory public for the first time in a paper derived to the Linnean Society in 1858. The paper began, ‘All nature hidden, extorted by its adhering agenda embedded to the primitivity of its shaken hostilities as once founded imbedded within the organisms of one another, or with other congestive appetites that gives to the characterology by some externalized nature. In the Origins of Species, Darwin speaks more specifically about the charter of this war: ‘There must be in every case a struggle for existence one individual either with another of the same species, or with the individual with another of the same species, and still, with the individuals of distinct species, or with physical condition of life.’ All these assumptions are apparent in Darwin's definition of natural selection: If under chancing conditions of life organic brings present individual differences in almost every part of their structure, and that all construing metabolisms cannot dispute this: If there be, owing to their geometrical rate of an increase, a severe struggle for life to some age, season, or year, and this certainty can then, be considered the infinite complexity of the relating of all organic being to each other and to their conditions of life causing an infinite diversity in structure, constitution, habits, to be advantageous as those that it would be most extraordinary fact if no variations had ever occurred usefully to each being' own welfare. Nevertheless, in the variations useful any organic being ever d occurred, absurdly individuals thus characterized will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life, and from the strong principle of inheritances, that often have a tendency to produce offsprings similarly characterized. Thus the principle of preservation, of resembling the survival of the fittest-is called Natural Selection.
Based on the assumption that the study of variation in domestic animals and plants, ‘afforded the best and safest clue' to understanding evolution. Unforeseeably, the humans who domesticated animals were the first to fall victim to the newly evolved germs, but those humans then evolved substantial resistance to the new diseases. When such partly immune people came into contact with others who had no previous exposure to the germ, epidemics resulted in which up to 99 percent of the previously unexposed population was killed. Germs thus acquired ultimately from domestic animals played decisive roles in the European conquests of Native Americans, Australians, South Africans, and Pacific islanders.
Yet as before, the same pattern repeated itself elsewhere in the world, whenever peoples lacking native wild mammal species suitable for finally had the opportunity to acquire by Native Americans in both North and South America, within a generation of the escape of horses from Europe settlements. For example, by the 19th century North America's Great Plain Indians were famous as expert horse-mounted warriors and bison hunters, but they did not even obtain horses until the late 17th century. Sheep acquired from Spaniards similarly transformed Navajo Indian society and led to, among other things, the weaving of the beautiful woolen blankets for which the Navajo have become renowned. Within a decade of Tasmania's settlement by Europeans with dogs, Aboriginal Tasmanian's who had never before seen dogs, began to breed them in large numbers for use in hunting. Thus, among the thousands of culturally diverse native peoples of Australia. The America, and Africa, no universal cultural taboo stood in the way of animal.
Surely, if some local wild mammal species of those continents had been domesticable, some Australian, American, and African peoples would have domesticated them and gained great advantage from them, just as they benefited from the Eurasian domestic animals that they immediately adopted when those became available. For instance, consider all the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa living within the range of wild zebras and buffalo. Why wasn't there at least on African hunter-gatherer tribe that domesticated those zebras and buffalo and that thereby gained sway over other Africans, without having to await the arrival of Eurasian horses and cattle? All these facts show that the explanation for the lack of native mammal outside Eurasia lay with the locally available wild mammals themselves, nor with the local people.
To the point, evidence for the same interpretation comes from pets. Keeping wild animals as pets, and taming them. Constitute an initial stage in. However, pets have been reported from virtually all traditional human societies on all continents. The variety of wild animals thus tamed is far grater than the variety eventually domesticated, and includes some species that we would scarcely have imagined as pets.
Given our proximity to the animals we love, we must be getting constantly bombarded by their microbes. Those invaders get winnowed by natural selection, and only a few of them succeed in establishing themselves as human diseases.
The first stage is illustrated by dozens of diseases that we now and then pick up directly from our pets and domestic animals. They include cat-scratch fever from our cats, leptospirosis from our dogs, psittacosis from our chickens and parrots, and brucellosis from our cattle. We're similarly liable to pick up diseases from wild animals, such as the tularaemia that hunters can get from skinning wild rabbits. All those microbes are still at an early stage in their evolution into specialized human pathogens. They still don't get transmitted directly from one person to another, and even their transfer to us from animals remain uncommon.
In the second stage a former animal pathogen evolves to the point where it does get transmitted directly between people and causes epidemics. However, the epidemic dies out for any of several reasons, such for being cured by modern medicine, or being stopped when everybody around has already been infected and either becomes immune or dies. For example, a previously unknown fever termed O'nyong-nyong fever appeared in East Africa in 1959 and proceeded to infect several million Africans. It probably arose from a virus of monkeys and was transmitted humans by mosquitoes. The fact that patients recovered quickly and became immune too further attack helped the new disease die out quickly. Closer to home for Americans, Fort Gragg fever was the name applied to a new leptospiral disease that broke out in the United States an the summer of 1942 and soon disappeared.
A third stage in the evolution of our major diseases is represented by former animal pathogens that did establish themselves in humans, whom have not (not yet?) died out, and that may or may not still become major killers of humanity. The future remains very uncertain for Lassa fever, caused by a virus derived probably from rodents. Lassa fevers were first observed in 1969 in Nigeria, were it causes a fatal illness so contagious that Nigerian hospitals have been closed down if even a single case appears. Better established is Lyme disease, caused by a spirochete that we get from the bite of ticks carried by mice and deer. Although the first known human cases in the United States appeared only as recently as 1962, Lyme disease is already reaching epidemic proportions in many parts of our country. the future of AIDS, derived from monkey viruses and first documented in humans around 1959, is even secure (from the virus's perspective).
The final stage of this evolution is represented by the major, long-established epidemic diseases confined to humans. These diseases must have been the evolutionary survivors of far more pathogens that tried to make the jump to us from animal, and mostly failed.
In short, diseases represent evolution in progress, and microbes adapt by natural selection to new hosts and vectors. Nonetheless, compared with cows' bodies, ours offer different immune defences, lice, faeces, and chemistries. In that new environment, a microbe must evolve new ways to live and to propagate itself. In several instructive cases doctors or veterinarians have been able to observe microbes evolving those new ways.
Darwin concluded that nature could by crossbreeding and selection of traits, provide new species. His explanation of the mechanism in nature that results in a new specie took the form of a syllogism: (1) the principle of geometric increases indicated that more individuals in each species will have produced than can survive, (2) the struggle for existence occurs as one organism competes with another, (3) in this struggle for existence, slight variations, if they prove advantageous will accumulate to produce new species, in analogy with the animal breeder's artificial selection of traits Darwin termed the elimination of the disadvantaged and the promotion of the advantaged natural selection.
In Darwin's view, the struggle for existence occurs ‘between' an atomized individual organism and of the atomized individual organisms in the same species: ‘between' and ‘atomized' individual organisms of new species with that of a different species, or ‘between' an atomized individual organism and the physical conditions of life the whole as Darwin conceived it is the collection of all atomized individual organisms, or parts. The struggle for survival occurs ‘between' or ‘outside' the parts. Since Darwin's viewing this struggle as the only limiting condition in which the accountable rate of an increase in organises, he assumed that rate will be geometrical when the force of a struggle between parts is weak and that the rate will decline with the force becomes stronger.
Natural selection occurred, said Darwin, when variations applicatively form; as each being accountable for through his own welfare,' or useful to the welfare of an atomized individual organism, provides a survival advantage and the organism produces ‘offspring similarly characterized.' Since the force that makes this selection operates ‘outside' the totality of parts. For example, the ‘infinite complexities of relations of all organic beings to each other and to their condition of liveliness' refers to dealing relations between parts, and the ‘infinite diversity in structure, constitute habit' refers to remaining traits within the atomized part. It seems clear in our view that the atomized individual organism in Darwin's biological machine reassembles classical atoms and that the force that drives the interactions of the atomized parts, the ‘struggle for life' resembles Newton's force of universal gravity. Although Darwin parted company with classical determinism in the claim that changes, of mutations, within organisms occurred randomly, his view of the relationship between parts and wholes essentially mechanistic.
Darwinism belief in the theory of ‘evolution' by natural selection took form in its original formality from the observation of Malthus, although belonging principally to the history of science, as these encountering beliefs are met straight on into a philosophically influenced Malthus's Essay on Population (1798) in undermining the Enlightenment belief in unlimited possibilities of human progress and perfection. The Origin of Species was principally successful in marshalling the evidence for evolution, than providing a convincing mechanism for genetic change; Darwin himself remained open to the search for additional in its mechanisms, while also remaining convinced that naturae section was at the heart of it. It was only with the later discovery of him ‘gene' as the unit of inheritance hast the synthesis known as ‘neo-Darwinism' became the orthodox theory of evolution in life science.
Human Evolution, is pressively the process through which a lengthy period of change is admissively given by people who have originated from apelike ancestors. Scientific evidence shows that the physical and behavioural traits shared by all people evolved over a period of at least six million years.
One of the earliest defining human traits, Bipedalism -walking on two legs as the primary form of locomotion-undergoes an evolution of more than four million years ago. Other important human characteristics-such as a large and complex brain, the ability to make and use tools, and the capacity for language-developed more recently. Many advanced traits,-including complex symbolic expression, such as art, and elaborate cultural diversity emerged mainly during the past 100,000 years.
Humans are primates. Physical and genetic similarities show that the modern human species, Homo sapiens, has a very close relationship to another group of primate species, the apes. Humans and the so-called great apes (large apes) of Africa-chimpanzees (including bonobos, or so-called pygmy chimpanzees) and gorillas,-share a common ancestor that lived sometime between eight million and six million years ago. The earliest humans evolved in Africa, and much of human evolution occurred on that continent. The fossils of early humans who lived between six million and two million years ago come entirely from Africa.
Early humans first migrated out of Africa into Asia probably between two million and 1.7 million years ago. They entered Europe so-so later, generally within the past one million years. Species of modern humans populated many parts of the world much later. For instance, people first came to Australia probably within the past 60,000 years, and to the Americas within the past 35,000 years. The beginnings of agriculture and the rise of the first civilizations occurred within the past 10,000 years.
The scientific study of human evolution is called Paleoanthropology. Paleoanthropology is a sub-field of anthropology, the study of human culture, society, and biology. Paleoanthropologists search for the roots of human physical traits and behaviour. They seek to discover how evolution has shaped the potentials, tendencies, and limitations of all people. For many people, Paleoanthropology is an exciting scientific field because it illuminates the origins of the defining traits of the human species, as well as the fundamental connections between humans and other living organisms on Earth. Scientists have abundant evidence of human evolution from fossils, artifacts, and genetic studies. However, some people find the concept of human evolution troubling because it can seem to conflict with religious and other traditional beliefs about how people, other living things, and the world came to be. Yet many people have come to reconcile such beliefs with the scientific evidence.
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